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Abstract
This is the first empirical evidence on the competition between high-frequency traders
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1 INTRODUCTION
High-frequency traders (HFTs) are market participants that are distinguished by the high speed
with which they react to incoming news, the low inventory on their books, and the large number of
trades they execute.1 By virtue of their substantial share of today’s equity markets (ranging from
50% to 85%), HFTs warrant the attention of both academics and practitioners, especially with
the recent rise in calls for legislative and regulatory intervention.2 Existing empirical research
focuses on the general effects of high-frequency trading on liquidity, price discovery and volatility.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the question of the impact of competition between HFTs on
these market quality measures has not been addressed. In fact, competition may alter the effects
of high-frequency trading on markets as each HFT’s trading strategy is likely to be affected by
what other HFTs do. Does competition between HFTs, therefore, ultimately improve market
quality and dynamics, and thus benefit investors who use and rely upon financial markets as, for
example, the Economist (3/7/12) suggests?
Although high-frequency trading techniques are used primarily by professional traders [...]
average investors benefit from their use. [...] intense competition between high-frequency traders
reduces the transaction costs [...] [and benefits long-term investors].
Economist Debates: High-frequency trading. Jim Overdahl, Vice-president, Securities and Finance Practice, National
Economic Research Associates.
A comprehensive understanding of high-frequency trading competition should aid the efficient
functioning of financial markets and enable appropriate regulatory action to be taken. However,
empirical work has left this concern over the potential effects of competition between HFTs
untouched.
In this paper, we examine the effect of competition between HFTs, so as to assess its impact
on market quality, using trade-by-trade data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange (NASDAQ
OMXS). Contrary to most related literature, we can observe HFTs’ identities and therefore
1The SEC (2010) report defines HFTs as market participants that end the day with close to zero inventories,
frequently submit and cancel limit orders, use co-location facilities and highly efficient algorithms, and have short
holding periods.
2Through highly competitive and quick market platforms, the advantages of technologies such as co-location,
and/or the use of ultra-quick algorithms, HFTs have influenced financial markets substantially (see, for example
Jain (2005)). The TABB Group, a financial market research company, finds the high-frequency trading share to be
73% at US stock exchanges, whereas Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2012) estimate it to be about 85% (see
their Table 1).
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distinguish between different high-frequency trading accounts.3 The first entries of HFTs into the
Swedish stock market in 2009 offer a unique chance to investigate the effects of competition, as
the high-frequency trading competition varies both among stocks and with time.4 By conducting
a difference-in-differences analysis, we identify the effects on market quality of HFTs facing
competition from other HFTs. This difference-in-differences analysis exploits cross-sectional
differences between those stocks with one active HFT and those with two or more active HFTs.5
To establish a causal argument, we use an exogenous event, which is explained in more detail
below, that plausibly triggered HFTs to start competing for trades.
Competition between HFTs might have an ambiguous effect on market quality. As HFTs are
not regulated, they appear to pursue all profit maximizing short-term investment opportunities.
These high-frequency trading opportunities may roughly be divided into liquidity-providing trading
strategies and liquidity-consuming trading strategies. On the one hand, competition over truly
liquidity-providing trades improves market quality and benefits long-term investors. In order to
successfully place orders with a high-frequency market making strategy, for instance, HFTs trade
closer to the price midpoint (between bid price and ask price). Spreads decrease and liquidity rises.
On the other hand, HFTs do not solely concentrate on liquidity-providing strategies such as market
making, but also liquidity-consuming strategies, which worsen market quality. An example of a
high-frequency trading strategy with adverse effects on market quality is directional or momentum
trading where HFTs buy (sell) during short-term price increases (decreases), chasing the trend.
This trend could be triggered by a large trade of a mutual fund, for example, where the fund
splits large orders into a series of smaller ones. Subsequently, HFTs try to follow or anticipate
this trend (see for instance Hirschey (2013)). Under competition, HFTs pursuing this strategy
not only attempt to anticipate trends, but also try to trade ahead of competing HFTs. Thus,
price trends are amplified and liquidity deteriorates. To sum up, competition between HFTs
3See, for example, Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2012) or Hasbrouck and Saar (2012), who work with
a NASDAQ dataset that flags messages from 26 HFTs, but does not distinguish between individual HFTs. This
has been the most comprehensive high-frequency trading database available to researchers for the last few years.
Hagstromer and Norden (2013) use the same data as ours but over a later period, and distinguish between groups
of HFTs.
4All HFTs active in the Swedish equity market at that time were large internationally well-established banks
or hedge funds that were also significant players in the American equity market. See Section 3 for a more detailed
explanation.
5Throughout the rest of the paper, we will use the terminology of entries and exits in the following sense: an
entry represents a change from one HFT to two or more HFTs trading in an individual stock, and an exit represents
a change from two or more HFTs to one HFT trading in an individual stock.
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utilizing liquidity-providing strategies leads to a positive effect on market quality. However, it
is possible for the overall effect of competition on market quality to be negative, if the adverse
effect from competition between HFTs using liquidity-consuming strategies is sufficiently strong.
In this paper, we examine empirically how HFTs are affected by competition and its effect on
market quality.
Our findings imply deteriorating market quality for stocks facing competition between HFTs,
compared to those in which just one HFT is trading. We find that liquidity, as measured by
Amihud (2002)’s measure of illiquidity and price impact factors, decreases significantly. More
specifically, sixty-minute liquidity decreases by about 15% and five-minute liquidity by about 9%.
Trade price impact increases by about 22%.6 Furthermore, intraday hourly volatility increases
by 20%, five-minute volatility by 9% and maximum intraday volatility by about 14%. Interday
volatility, whether measured from opening to closing or from closing to closing prices, however,
shows no sign of a significant increase or decrease.
Our empirical analysis suggests that these findings originate from an increase in liquidity
consumption by HFTs when they are competing for trades with other HFTs. We find that HFTs
in competition trade on the same side of the market in about 70% of cases when looking at
five-minute intraday periods, and have a correlation of 0.35 between their inventories. To capture
changes in high-frequency liquidity provision through competing HFTs, we examine ratios of
liquidity-consuming trades to all high-frequency trades. We document that these ratios double
from about 30% to about 60%. Furthermore, we suggest a new measure that captures directional
trading, allowing us to investigate changes in momentum trading when HFTs compete. Our
findings imply that this trend chasing indeed increases significantly for stocks for which there is
competition between HFTs.
While high-frequency trading volume doubles to an average of about 20% in a competitive
environment, there is no significant change in the overall volume. This suggests that when a stock
becomes subject to competing HFTs, the population of traders trading in it changes. Traders
that are likely to be crowded out might be, for instance, non-high-frequency liquidity providers.
However, the increase in high-frequency trading volume does not lead to a significant change
in overall high-frequency trading profits. Markets also become quicker: median order execution
6See Section 3 for a detailed description of our measures. Net buying volume is the turnover of actively purchased
shares minus the turnover of actively sold shares.
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time, defined as the length of time between an incoming market order or marketable limit order
and the standing limit order against which the trade is executed, decreases by about 19%.
Interpreting these results as evidence of the causal effect of competition on market dynamics
is only valid if competition can be treated as exogenous to the dependent variables examined.
The limitation in our main analysis is that the decision of an HFT to begin trading in an
individual stock is a choice, which generates concerns about endogeneity. We address these
concerns in several ways. First, we provide evidence that pre-event stock characteristics do not
determine entry, by comparing the pre-competition behavior of a propensity-score-matched sample
of the stocks that will be facing competition in the upcoming periods (the treatment group)
against a propensity-score-matched sample of firms that will not be (the control group). Our
tests suggest similar estimates to those in the main analysis, both in terms of magnitude and
significance. Second, to further test the causal relationship, we exploit a plausibly exogenous
event. The Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) tick size harmonization that
was implemented on October 26th, 2009 and decreased tick sizes by about 50% for most but not
all of the stocks in the sample. Stocks that happen to fall within a certain price range prior
the event were not affected and serve as controls. Additionally, the details of the event allow us
to untie direct effects caused by this tick size change from competition effects. We conjecture
that a HFT is expected to benefit from low relative tick sizes as she can take advantage of
more trading opportunities.7 When relative tick sizes exogenously fall below a certain level, the
benefits of entering exceed its costs and additional HFTs start trading. Our findings suggest that
the decision to enter at the day of the event was indeed induced by this new relative tick size
range, which was not available before. We predict that stocks will face competition between HFTs
if pre-event prices fall within a price range that will lead to a relative tick size below a certain
threshold after the regime change. Our findings for the direct effect suggest an improvement
in market quality that is associated with an increase in high-frequency trading. The effects of
competition, however, are the same, in magnitude and significance, as for the entire sample and
show deteriorating market quality. Since high-frequency trading activity also increases without
competing HFTs, and market quality seems to improve, this suggests that competition between
HFTs rather than high-frequency trading volume itself adversely affects market quality. There are
7See for example Gai, Yao, and Ye (2013) who find that there is more high-frequency market making with a low
tick size.
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also no significant pre-event differences in any of the endogenous variables between the treatment
and control groups. Overall, all of the tests give us additional confidence that competition causes
change in market quality rather than the other way around.
We provide several other pieces of evidence that validate and extend our findings. First, we
provide evidence that the pre-treatment parallel trend assumption, which is the key identifying
assumption behind a difference-in-differences analysis, is validated.8 Second, we report all of our
findings separately for both entries and exits, and show that exits have an opposite effect to entries,
of equal magnitude. Third, we take into account that HFTs might differ in aggressiveness, and
control for entries (exits) with an aggressive entrant, but find solely insignificant results. Fourth,
to rule out time trends and cross-stock differences, we control for day-fixed effects and stock-fixed
effects in all regressions. Finally, we relax our binary definition of competition by exploiting a
continuous measure of competition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The regression results are
very similar to our main findings. Overall, our robust results support a causal interpretation
that high-frequency trading competition is exogenous to the market quality measures and other
endogenous variables affected by competition.
The paper contributes to the rapidly growing empirical literature on high-frequency trading.
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2012) show that HFTs react more quickly to new hard information,
and are therefore less subject to adverse selection, than other traders. Hasbrouck and Saar
(2012) discover an amplified volatility effect due to runs on linked messages in the order book,
while Kirilenko, Kyle, and Tuzun (2011) mention that HFTs may have exacerbated the flash
crash in May 2010, but did not cause it.9 Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2012) find
that high-frequency trading improves price discovery and efficiency. Moreover, Hendershott and
Riordan (2013) show that algorithmic trading both provides and demands liquidity, and makes
prices more efficient. Carrion (2013) documents correlations between HFTs providing (consuming)
liquidity and larger (smaller) spreads. There is also an increasing number of papers documenting
HFTs’ activities. Hirschey (2013) uncovers that HFTs seem to anticipate non-high-frequency
trading. Baron, Brogaard, and Kirilenko (2012) find that HFTs earn large and stable profits, while
8The above-mentioned propensity score matching is just one such piece of analysis. Figure 3 illustrates that,
other than the treatment itself, there is no difference between the short-term volatility in the treated and control
groups.
9The work of Kirilenko, Kyle, and Tuzun (2011) is unique in the sense that it makes use of the first adequately
identified data made available to researchers by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
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Clark-Joseph (2013) examines the profitability of HFTs’ aggressive orders using the same data.
Huh (2013) argues that, in markets where HFTs are liquidity providers and takers, the ability
to use machine-readable public information is crucial for HFTs. Hagstromer and Norden (2013)
make an attempt to distinguish between liquidity providers (or high-frequency market makers)
and liquidity takers (or aggressive HFTs), documenting that most high-frequency trading appears
to be market making. Menkveld (2013) provides results of an event study on a market-making
HFTs entering a new trading venue. In contrast to our paper, none of these studies consider the
effect of competition among HFTs on markets.
Theoretically, competition between HFTs may have an effect on market quality. There is a
developing theoretical literature that investigates the benefits or disadvantages of competition
between HFTs (or more general short-term investors). Li (2013), based on Chau and Vayanos
(2008) who model a monopolistic informed trader, shows that competition increases trading
aggressiveness, efficiency and market depth, volume and variance. Li (2013)’s model shows
that there is a trade-off in the effect of competition on market depth, but concludes that the
market quality improvement outweighs its worsening. However, Li (2013) thinks of HFTs as
arbitrageurs and does not consider other high-frequency trading strategies. Similarly, Martinez
and Rosu (2013) show that with more HFTs volatility, volume and liquidity increase. In contrast,
as suggested by our empirical findings, competition between HFTs may cause a deterioration of
market quality. In fact, De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) argue that an increase
in the number of speculators who buy assets when prices rise and sell when prices fall may lead
to an overreaction of markets. Furthermore, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) show that with
competition between strategic traders, prices overshoot and liquidity deteriorates. Last, Vayanos
and Wang (2012) model rational hedgers with asymmetric information on expected returns and
find that competition may reduce liquidity.
The paper also belongs to the somewhat wider literature of algorithmic trading, which is a
broader classification than high-frequency trading.10 Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011)
investigate the latter using the automation of quotes on the NYSE as an exogenous event, and
find it to have a positive effect on liquidity. Foucault and Menkveld (2008) show how investors
10Both high-frequency trading and algorithmic trading use algorithms to trade. While algorithmic trading is used
to automate, for example, block trades to minimize price impact or for hedging, high-frequency trading involves
short-term investments aimed at making profits from buying and (immediately) selling.
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benefit from the liquidity supply provided by smart routers in multiple markets. Boehmer, Fong,
and Wu (2013) find evidence, by exploiting co-location services across different countries, that
algorithmic trading improves liquidity and informational efficiency, but also increases short-term
volatility.
Our results have important implications for both regulators and trading venues. The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) states that high-frequency trading should only be
allowed if it benefits long-term investors. In fact, the SEC’s rules are aimed at increasing
competition among liquidity suppliers. However, our results highlight that competition may
lead to a deterioration of market quality rather than an improvement. Our findings suggest
further that this originates from an increase in liquidity consuming high-frequency trades. It
appears, therefore, to be of critical importance to take appropriate regulatory action to ensure
that competition between HFTs is indeed competition between liquidity providers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we develop testable hypotheses to
structure our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes our NASDAQ OMXS data as well as our
measures of market quality and trading. Section 4 describes the methodology we use to exploit
cross-sectional variations between stocks. Section 5 depicts our empirical findings, and we then
provide several robustness checks in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
This section looks at the arguments on how competition between HFTs might affect liquidity,
volatility or the population of traders, and discusses their empirical implications. We develop
a theoretical trade-off to structure our empirical analysis by addressing potential channels that
could cause market quality to differ between stocks facing competition from HFTs and those
without such competition.
With the calls for regulative and legislative interventions, advocates of high-frequency trading
like to point to the advantages it brings in terms of market efficiency and liquidity provision.
Their main argument is that HFTs are not doing anything particularly differently from the old
market makers, but are just better and quicker at it. They are engaged in the same business
of making two-sided markets.11 In contrast, HFTs should exploit both liquidity-providing and
11This was, for example, recently debated in The Economist, ”Electronic Trading - Dutch Fleet”, April 20th,
2013.
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liquidity-consuming short-term investment strategies as long as these remain profitable.12 Without
knowing the actual algorithms that are in place, it is hard to argue for one or the other strategy
from looking at their trading outcome.13 There is a second argument suggesting that HFTs
follow just one profit-generating strategy as , for instance, the Economist (20/4/2013) suggests:
”[HFTs pursue] lots of different strategies. Some HFTs are momentum traders, riding the wave
of a particular trend. Others arbitrage price differences. Others still are market makers providing
liquidity to buyers and sellers.”14 In fact, there is no reason why an HFT should concentrate on
one strategy only. In effect, HFTs should exploit all short-term investment strategies that are
profitable. Furthermore, there is a finite number of short-term investment strategies that HFTs
can exploit. There might be differences in nuances and speed of execution, but HFTs look for the
same investment opportunities.15
It makes economic sense, therefore, that competition between HFTs implies competition over
the same trades. A limited and positively correlated number of profit-generating high-frequency
trading strategies can expected to have direct effects on market quality and thus on other
investors.16 These effects are likely to be different under competition between HFTs, depending
on their short-term investment strategies.
On the one hand, there are liquidity-providing short-term investment strategies that give
long-term investors the benefits of reduced spreads and more efficient prices. HFTs competing
for these liquidity-providing strategies accept lower profits, which benefits long-term investors.
Competition here creates low margins for liquidity providers. Take, for instance, a true market
maker, who places passive orders on both sides of the market and does not cancel them when
the stock price moves there. To be first in the order book, HFTs offer lower prices. HFTs may
also earn a premium by incorporating news more quickly than their competitors, which results in
12See Appendix C for a detailed description of high-frequency trading strategies.
13Even the fact that a trade is passive (non-marketable limit order) or active (marketable order) could be
misleading, for example, anticipating block trades where passive orders on the same side as the block trade will
amplify price movements.
14The Economist, February 25th, 2012, ”High-Frequency Trading: The Fast and the Furious”.
15The speeds at which trades are executed keep increasing due to investments in trading technology. This makes
it more expensive for smaller rivals to compete, leading to markets dominated by a few HFTs. Clark-Joseph (2013)
documents that the combined total trading volume of the eight largest HFTs accounts for the majority of all
high-frequency trading in the American market. In addition, these eight large traders are very unlikely to be of
equal size, which would imply that even fewer HFTs conduct the lion’s share of high-frequency trading volume.
16We find that, in 70% of cases, HFTs trade on the same side of the market and that their inventories are
positively correlated.
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a more efficient price.17 Competition over liquidity-providing strategies should improve market
quality.
On the other hand, since high-frequency trading is generally done without the restrictions of
regulatory rules, HFTs may also undertake liquidity-consuming short-term investment strategies.
One strategy that reduces market quality is the directional or momentum strategy. HFTs chase
the price trend attempting to sell (buy) at the peak of the short-term price increase (decrease).
This trading strategy, by which HFTs attempt to profit from non-HFTs’ future buying and selling
pressure, will lead to an amplification of the price movement when there is competition between
HFTs. To successfully place orders, HFTs will place more orders on one side of the market,
trying to front-run block trading (Hirschey (2013)) and their competing HFTs. There is another
plausible argument for competition increasing HFTs’ liquidity-consuming trading. Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2005) model financially constrained strategic traders (HFTs) that will eventually
need to liquidate their positions. This is observed by other strategic traders (HFTs). Prices
overshoot and liquidity deteriorates.18 Competition over liquidity-consuming high-frequency
trading strategies might have a negative effect on market quality.
With HFTs competing for short-term investments, they strive to make their algorithms more
sophisticated and quicker in order to stay profitable. This should have direct effects on other
non-high-frequency intraday traders, such as the traditional registered and regulated market
makers, who simply cannot stay competitive. With increasing high-frequency trading activity,
the chances of slower day-traders being profitable decrease further.19 Markets become quicker
and the population of traders changes.
Overall, the effect of competition between HFTs may have two opposing effects: First, competition
over liquidity-providing strategies such as market making will improve market quality. Second,
competition over liquidity-consuming strategies such as anticipatory trading will worsen market
quality. Whether high-frequency trading increases market quality overall remains an empirical
question and is the subject of following analysis.
17There are other liquidity-providing strategies, which are explained in the appendix.
18Figure 1 also shows that some traders are constrained and often seem to trade at their limit.
19A famous example is LaBranche Specialist, a long-time specialist on the NYSE that exited the market in 2010 as
new rules and technology made profitability difficult. High-frequency market making can respond more quickly and
potentially follow more sophisticated strategies. Non-high-frequency market makers are likely to be less successful
in placing their orders.
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3 DATA
In this section, we start by discussing the data and then move on to market quality and high-frequency
trading measures.
3.1 Trading Database
The tick trading data come from NASDAQ OMX Nordic and incorporate all trading information
for all trades executed on the Stockholm stock exchange (NASDAQ OMXS). We focus on the
OMXS30 index, which hosts the thirty biggest public companies in Sweden, because we observe
that HFTs trade solely in liquid stocks, and restrict their trading activity to Sweden’s major
securities. The sample period is from June to December 2009. Trade timestamps are in milliseconds
and ranked within each millisecond. Trades undertaken on the NASDAQ OMXS account for
about 80% of total trading volume in all Swedish trading venues, with a seemingly higher share of
continuous trading.20 Daily relative time-weighted spreads are taken from the NASDAQ OMX,
and were provided separately. We also rely on COMPUSTAT GLOBAL for daily measures that
do not need to be calculated from the trading data.
Table 1 gives an overview, and key statistics, for all thirty stocks traded in the OMXS30.
We provide the mean and the standard deviation of daily averages for the number of trades,
volume, turnover and relative time-weighted spreads. The number of stock trades per day varies
between 1247 and 6103 across all stocks. The average relative time-weighted spread in our sample
is between 0.09% and 0.24%.21 Column 3 shows how often a specific stock occurs as a control,
column 4 gives the number of changes from a single HFT to two or more HFTs trading in the stock,
and column 5 vice versa. Events and controls are fairly well distributed among the securities, with
three exceptions. Neither Scania AB, which is overly represented in terms of entries and exits,
nor Nokia Corporation nor Lundin Petroleum AB, which do not show any entries or exits, drives
our results. The number of unique trading days considered for each stock, before and after entry
or exit, is shown in column 6. This is explained in more detail in the later analysis.
20The Stockholm Stock Exchange lost, in particular, over-the-counter trades to the competing trading venues of
BATS Chi-X Europe, Burgundy and Turquoise. In comparison, the NASDAQ’s share of NASDAQ-listed shares in
the US was about 30% of trading volume in 2009. Appendix B provides more institutional details.
21This lies in the range of American medium-cap and large-cap stocks (Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan
(2012)).
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[Insert Table 1 about here!]
The key distinction of the database that we use is that it allows us to identify proprietary
traders that are members of the stock exchange, down to a level showing the channels through
which they execute their trades. HFTs will naturally execute their trades by taking advantage of
the cheapest and fastest means of access, the algorithmic trading accounts. There are less than
ten HFTs in our sample, all with significant trading participation. The HFTs in our sample are
large international HFTs with a significant market share in the American market.22 Due to our
confidentiality agreement with NASDAQ OMXS, we cannot release either names or exact numbers
of traders. Individual HFTs have about a 10% market share. Other traders that execute trades
through algorithmic accounts participate only occasionally and do not satisfy high-frequency
trading characteristics (such as low end-of-day inventory or short holding periods).
We cannot release summary statistics for all individual high-frequency trading accounts, but
we show statistics for the two most different HFTs in Table 2. Statistics are reported for the
daily fraction of high-frequency trading in the entire market, with an average of about 10%, the
absolute number of daily high-frequency trades, around 280 per day and stock, the fraction of
total daily volume, around 10%, and the fraction of aggressive trades.23 These two HFTs differ
mostly in aggressiveness. While HFT A executed 91% of its trades aggressively, for HFT B the
figure is 35%. Aggressiveness, however, does not necessarily stand for differences in investment
strategies, but might just reflect differences in execution. Strategies can be exploited by screening
the market and jumping actively on opportunities (snake execution strategy) or by passively
submitting and cancelling orders. To show this, we provide statistics for the most intuitive of our
high-frequency trading measure that divides high-frequency trades into liquidity consuming and
liquidity providing trades. We find that HFT A has a liquidity consuming trade ratio of about
60% on average and HFT B of about 54% with no significant difference between them. We will
also address potential differences of HFTs in our regression analysis.
[Insert Table 2 about here!]
22HFTs list their activities and sometimes their market shares on their web pages.
23An aggressive trade is an incoming market order or marketable limit order that is executed against a standing
limit order.
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We limit our attention to event windows around our 228 entries into and exits from stock
trading by (different) HFTs. These event windows are up to six days long, from up to three days
before to up to three days after the entry or exit. The average length of an event is 4.3 days. The
reason for the differences in lengths is that there might be a change in the competition status less
than three days before or after the event.24 Stocks with competing HFTs within the event window
belong to the treatment group and stocks with just one HFT trading to the control group. Note
that event windows might overlap, but we do not duplicate observations.
Market quality measures and high-frequency trading measures rely on price midpoints (the
price between the bid and the ask price). Since our data do not include orders, we cannot observe
the actual midpoint prices. We develop a new technique to approximate them. We evaluate our
methodology by comparing the approximated spreads to the actual corresponding spreads. The
spreads are nearly perfectly approximated and show a correlation of 0.99. We give a detailed
description of this approximation procedure in Appendix A.
3.2 Market Quality and Trading Measures
This subsection presents the liquidity measures, the high-frequency trading measures, and other
variables needed to analyze how market quality changes when HFTs compete for the same trades.
3.2.1 High-Frequency Trading Measures
To analyze high-frequency trading activity, we use an intuitive measure of liquidity consumption
and propose a new measure of directional momentum trading.
First, the measure of high-frequency liquidity consumption is a simple ratio of the number of
high-frequency consuming trades to all high-frequency trades. Alternatively, we look at turnover
instead of number of trades. A high-frequency trade is assumed to be consuming liquidity if the
stock midpoint price moved upwards (downwards) prior to a high-frequency buy (sell) trade;
otherwise, it is assumed to be providing liquidity. We construct our measure for both the
one-minute period and the five-minute period prior to each midpoint price change. The intuition
behind this measure is that, given a trend, a liquidity provider will execute trades in the opposite
direction to the trend. Trading with the trend amplifies it.
24The length of the event window is not crucial nor does it affect our results. Six days gives us a reasonable
number of events with observations further away from the event to show if the influence through competition is
permanent or temporary. For robustness, we also provide evidence for short-term events only in Section 6.
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Second, we detect one potential way that high-frequency trading might affect a stock’s liquidity.
We propose a new measure with which we can potentially capture directional or momentum
high-frequency trading. This measure is given by:
DIRECT1d,j =
1
T
T∑
t=1
rd,t,j
HFTvolbuy,d,t,j −HFTvolsell,d,t,j
turnoverd,t,j
(1)
with HFTvolbuy,d,t,j being high-frequency trading turnover from buy trades and HFTvolsell,d,t,j
being high-frequency trading turnover from sell trades on day d, over the five-minute interval t in
stock j. rd,t,j is the stock’s midpoint return over the five-minute interval and turnoverd,t,j is the
total stock turnover within this interval.
This measure becomes positive if HFTs buy with an increasing, or sell with a decreasing,
stock price, and negative when HFTs trade in the opposite direction to the price movement. A
positive DIRECT1 measure indicates directional or momentum trading, while a negative measure
indicates trading against the trend.
One concern could be that differences in our measure are not driven by a change in directional
high-frequency trading, but by differences in overall turnover within the five minutes. To deal
with this concern, we look at the daily average five-minute turnover:
DIRECT2d,j =
1
T
T∑
t=1
rd,t,j
HFTvolbuy,d,t,j −HFTvolsell,d,t,j
1
T
T∑
n=1
turnoverd,n,j
. (2)
Here,
T∑
n=1
turnoverd,n,j is the average stock turnover per five-minute interval and the other
variables are as defined previously.
It could also be that it is not the turnover ratio but the midpoint return that changes while
the turnover ratio remains constant. To address this concern, we construct another version of
our measure using an indicator function to determine an upward and downward midpoint price
movement rather than the actual return. Our measure becomes:
DIRECT3d,j =
1
T
T∑
t=1
DIRECTretd,t,j
HFTvolbuy,d,t,j −HFTvolsell,d,t,j
turnoverd,t,j
(3)
Here, DIRECTretd,t,j is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the return is positive within the
five-minute interval t and −1 when the return is negative. turnoverd,t,j is the total stock turnover
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within this interval. Note that the interpretation does not change; the measure becomes positive
with directional trading and negative with counter-directional trading.
We also attempt to calculate trading profits from high-frequency trades. We calculate daily
profits by summing up buy turnover and sell turnover. Non-zero end of day inventories are
assumed to be leveled at the closing price of the day. However, looking at profits from actual
stock trades does not necessarily reflect actual profits. For example, a trader who undertakes
index arbitrage will also trade index funds, which are not observed by our data. We will not
attempt to draw conclusions about the size of profits due to these limitation, but we will show
how this profit measure changes with competition.
3.2.2 Liquidity Measures
We measure liquidity using five-minute and hourly Amihud measures of illiquidity and five-minute
price impact factors.
First, we rely on a variation of the well-known Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity. While
the original measure was constructed from daily observations, we focus on five-minute and hourly
intervals to capture short-term illiquidities:
ILLIQd,j =
1
T
T∑
t=1
|rd,t,j |
turnoverd,t,j
. (4)
Here, rd,t,j is the stock’s midpoint return over the five-minute (hourly) period, and turnoverd,t,j
is the total stock turnover within this interval, on day d, in each five-minute (hourly) interval
t for stock j. The lower the turnover relative to a price change, or the larger the price change
relative to turnover, the higher is the illiquidity. Put differently, if buys and sells have relatively
little impact on the price, the stock is liquid.
Another way to capture how buying and selling affect prices is with price impact factors. The
intuition is similar to that for our first measure of liquidity but this one is regression based.
Daily price impacts are captured by:
rd,t,j = IMPACTd,j ∗NBVd,t,j + d,t,j . (5)
Here, rd,t,j are the five-minute returns calculated from the log midpoint prices and NBVd,t,j is the
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net buy turnover (turnover of active share purchases - turnover of active share sells). IMPACTd,j
is the price impact parameter and d,t,j the error term on day d, for each five-minute interval t and
stock j. To ensure that our daily estimates are comparable, we force all the explanatory power
onto the order flow by constraining the estimated α to be zero.
3.2.3 Volatility and Autocorrelation
We also look at five-minute volatility, hourly volatility, maximum intraday volatility, closing-to-opening
volatility, closing-to-closing volatility, and autocorrelations. Volatilities are given by:
V olad,j =
T∑
t=1
(rd,t,j)
2 (6)
with rd,t,j being the log midpoint return for day d over intraday time interval t for stock j.
While short-term volatilities over five and sixty minutes are computed using the above formula,
closing-to-closing, opening-to-closing and intraday high-to-low volatilities are simply squared
returns. Autocorrelation is calculated by:
Autocorrd,j =
T∑
t=1
cov(rd,t,j , rd,t−1,j)
var(rd,t,j)
(7)
where rd,t,j is again the log midpoint return for day d over intraday time interval t for stock j.
3.2.4 Order Execution Time
Order execution time measures the time difference between a limit order entering the order book
and being executed. It is an order resting time, in other words the time for which a limit order
has to rest in the order book until it is executed against an incoming marketable (limit) order.
We look at the median order execution time so as to ensure that the measure is not driven by a
few outliers that rest in the orderbook for hours or even sometimes days.
This measure gives an indication of the speed of trading in the market. HFTs tend to submit
orders quickly, and might cancel or resubmit orders. A relatively quick median order execution
time would also be a rough proxy for HFTs being present (i.e., trading in a stock).
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4 METHODOLOGY
We aim to compare measures of market quality such as liquidity or volatilities, and high-frequency
trading measures, over two situations: the one where HFTs face competition from other HFTs and
the one where they do not. The first entries of large international HFTs into the Swedish equity
market offer us a unique chance to empirically examine how competition affects market quality.
We use difference-in-differences tests similar to those in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)
to exploit daily cross-sectional differences among stocks. Stocks can face repeated competition
between HFTs over time, through entries and exits of HFTs. An entry is a change from no
high-frequency trading competition to high-frequency trading competition, and an exit is the
opposite change. In this section, we use both entries and exits simultaneously throughout the
main analysis. Within each event window, we assign stocks to be part of the control group if
there is one HFT active in them, and to the treatment group if there are two or more HFTs
active in them. This means that we have different control and treatment groups for each event.
The benefit is that multiple treatment and control groups reduce the bias and noise that can be
associated with a single comparison.
Under the assumption that treatment is random, or at least not determined by changes in the
endogenous variable, this approach permits us to interpret our findings as evidence of the causal
effect of competition on market dynamics. We will repeatedly discuss this critical assumption in
the following analysis and provide evidence of the causal effect of competition on market quality
and high-frequency trading behavior using a plausibly exogenous event in Section 6.
This difference-in-differences test setting is summarized in the following equation:
ye,j,d = β1de,j +Xe,j,dΓ + pd +mj + ue,j,d, (8)
with e indexing entry or exit , j being the security and d the time (day). de,j is an indicator of
whether a high-frequency trading event affected security j at time d. pd are daily time-fixed effects
and mj are security-fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term.
The dependent variable is ye,j,d and takes the form of market quality and trading measures in the
analysis. The key identifying assumption behind a difference-in-differences analysis is that, with
the exception of the treatment itself, there is no difference between the treated and control groups
that cannot be captured by stock-fixed effects. Put differently, the parallel trend assumption
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must hold, implying that there is a similar trend in the endogenous variable during the pre-event
period for both the treatment and the control group. Since, in our analysis, the same stocks do
serve as treatment and control stocks within different event windows, differences before an entry
or exit are small and turn out not to be significant. Figure 3 illustrates this for both short-term
illiquidity on the top graphs and high-frequency consuming turnover ratios on the bottom graphs
three days before and three days after the event. We depict entries on the left-hand-side of the
graph and exits on the right-hand-side. The small differences between the treatment and control
groups in the pre-event periods are not statistically different from each other. We will provide
further evidence on this repeatedly in the following analysis.
[Insert Figure 3 about here!]
Table 3 lists descriptive statistics for all stocks and days that serve as the control group
and for all stocks and days in the treatment group prior to competition or post competition.
Column (1) show statistics for the control group, column (2) gives statistics for the treatment
group, and column (3) provides differences between the control and treatment group. We depict
the short-term Amihud (2002)’s measure of illiquidity, price impact factor, daily stock turnover,
midpoint return auto-correlations and order-execution times. We further provide statistics for
hourly volatility, five-minute volatility, max-min volatility, open-to-close volatility and close-to-close
volatility. Last, we show statistics of liquidity consuming high-frequency trade ratios and of
liquidity consuming high-frequency turnover ratios. Overall, there is no significant difference
between the control and treatment groups.
[Insert Table 3 about here!]
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The first tests concern stock liquidity. We regress both the short-term Amihud (2002) measure
of illiquidity and price impact factors on competition between HFTs. The results are presented
in Table 4. In column 1, no additional controls that go beyond the basic difference-in-differences
setup are included in the regression. Looking at the effect of competition between HFTs requires
us to control for general differences between the treatment and control groups, the event type
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(entry or exit), and stock- and time-fixed effects. The variation we capture when we additionally
control for stock-fixed effects and HFT fixed effect is that of multiple entries or exits of different
HFTs. Note that errors are clustered by stocks as this is the level at which our variable of
interest varies.25 Our test suggests a positive and significant increase in illiquidity. In other
words, liquidity decreases when HFTs face high-frequency trading competition. In column 2, we
additionally control for the HFT-fixed effect, which adds little to R2 and makes no significant
difference on the measure of how competition affects illiquidity. In column 3, we also control
for lagged stock turnover, lagged bid-ask spreads and whether an existing HFT faces aggressive
or non-aggressive competition.26 While there is no significant difference between the events,
higher turnover is intuitively associated with lower illiquidity, and higher bid-ask spreads with
significantly higher illiquidity. The magnitude is not trivial. Stocks facing competition between
HFTs are predicted to be 15% less liquid, as measured by hourly intervals, or 9% less if measured
by five-minute intervals. Another way to show the liquidity of a stock is to use price impact
factors. Column 5 and column 6 show the regression results for net buying volume for five-minute
intervals. The estimates show a significant increase of 22% with an R2 of 87%. Overall, liquidity
is negatively affected by HFTs competing for trades. This also holds for all our extensions and
robustness checks, as we will show in the later analysis.
[Insert Tables 4 about here!]
In our second series of tests, we look at volatilities and regress them on competition. Table
5 provides the results of the difference-in-differences estimations for various volatilities. In this
approach, as mentioned above, variables that control for the level differences are necessary. These
are the differences between the treatment and control group, the event type (entry or exit), and
stock- and time-fixed effects. In column 1, we run the baseline model without stock-fixed effects
for hourly volatility on competition. In columns 2 through 4, we successively add stock-fixed
effects, HFT-fixed effects, and turnover and bid-ask spreads for different event types (aggressive
or not). The level estimates remain insignificant and volatility increases significantly in stocks
25We are aware that clustering standard errors on relatively few, here 30, clusters may distort results more than it
improves accuracy. Our analysis, however, does not suffer from these distortions, as we show and discuss in Section
6.
26An event is aggressive if the incoming HFT shows aggressiveness above the average of a 65% share of aggressive
orders (compared to 35% passive).
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facing competing HFTs. The increase in hourly volatility is about 20%. Figure 4 depicts these
dynamic impacts of entry and exit (separately) graphically for the three days before and after each
event. The graph on the left-hand-side illustrates the regression results for entries, and the graph
on the right-hand-side for exits. The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval. There is
no pre-trend before entry (exit); nor does the effect seem to be temporary. Five-minute volatility,
shown in column 5, increases by about 9% and the maximum squared price range during a trading
day (column 6) increases by 14%. Note that the data for the latter come from COMPUSTAT
Global since these volatilities rely on daily data, suggesting that we are likely to find similar
results with data from other sources. The two interday volatilities, squared open-to-close return
(column 7) and squared close-to-close return (column 8), show no significant changes. In sum,
intraday volatility increases significantly within the HFT’s investment horizon; we do not observe
any significant change in the interday volatility. This suggests that there are indeed no differences
between the treated and untreated observations within investment horizons where HFTs tend not
to be active. HFTs usually close their positions at the end of each trading day.
[Insert Table 11 and Figure 4 about here!]
We now turn to the HFT behavior that influences market quality. We find that if HFTs
compete for the same trades then, in 70% of the cases, they trade on the same side of the market.
In addition, the inventory of different HFTs is significantly positively correlated when stocks face
competition between HFTs. This suggests that HFTs indeed trade differently under competition.
To test this, we aim to provide evidence on how HFTs react to competition so as to provide reasons
why market quality is affected by competing HFTs. First, we test how liquidity consumption of
HFTs change. Column 1 through 7 of Table 6 show estimates how competition among HFTs affects
high-frequency liquidity consumption. Liquidity consuming trade ratios increase by about 28
percentage points (column 1 through 3). Considering the average being 30% of liquidity consuming
trades of total high-frequency trades, this suggest that liquidity consumption ratios double. We
depict similar results for high-frequency liquidity consuming turnover (column 4). Column 5
through 7 show regression results for liquidity consuming ratios for high-frequency trades that are
assigned to be liquidity consuming based on one minute midpoint price movements prior the trade.
Results are similar in both magnitude and significance and imply that relative high-frequency
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liquidity consumption doubles. Second, columns 8 through 10 show estimates of momentum
(directional) trading. Through competition between HFTs, high-frequency momentum trading
increases significantly. There is no statistical difference between these two estimates, implying that
the actual amount of trading within a five-minute period when HFTs are trading is not driving
the results. Our third directional trading measure, which is regressed on competition in column
7, and which captures changes solely in the ratio of directional high-frequency trading turnover
to overall turnover, also suggests a significant increase. Finally, our findings suggest that overall
high-frequency profit does not change significantly (column 11) with competition among HFTs.
This result, however, should be considered with caution as we only observe HFTs’ activities on
the equity market. We also rebalance end of day inventory, which is not necessarily close to zero,
to approximate profits.
Our findings suggest that competition between HFTs affects high-frequency trading behavior
and market quality. It is, however, difficult to argue that a trader’s endogenous decision to
compete is not influenced by any of our measures. For liquidity, for example, it seems possible
that HFTs might not prefer lower liquidity. The literature agrees that HFTs prefer liquid to
illiquid stocks. The reason for this is intuitive, as HFTs need someone to trade with in order
to make a profit. One could argue, however, that HFTs anticipate their influence on liquidity,
and therefore the selection of stocks would not be exogenous to liquidity. This anticipation could
lead HFTs to trade in stocks to which they would cause the least damage. Our results, therefore,
would be a lower bound and our interpretation would hold. For volatility, though, it is fairly
difficult to make an argument since we do not know the optimal level that HFTs prefer. We,
therefore, exploit a plausibly exogenous event in the next section.
6 ROBUSTNESS
This section presents the results of some important robustness checks. To address concerns about
endogeneity, we exploit a plausibly exogenous event, the FESE tick size harmonization. Then, we
conduct propensity score matching. This is followed by several other robustness checks: First, we
compare how entries and exits affect our measures of liquidity, volatility, and directional trading.
Second, we introduce as an alternative measure of competition: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
Third, we discuss short-term entries and exits before, finally, providing a discussion of clustered
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standard errors.
6.1 The FESE Tick Size Harmonization
The problem is that entries and exits to and from trading in individual stocks are endogenous
choices made by traders. A trader’s decision to trade could depend on many factors, including
liquidity and volatility. For example, Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) find evidence that algorithms
trade less often when markets are illiquid and extremely volatile. While the literature agrees that
HFTs prefer liquid stocks, the situation is less obvious for volatility. HFTs favor a certain level of
volatility, and probably also favor particular levels of other market quality measures. Thus, any of
them could cause an entry or exit. From an econometric perspective, this would lead to a biased
estimate of the causal effect of a change in high-frequency trading competition on market quality.
To approach these endogeneity issues with our baseline difference-in-differences approach above,
we exploit the plausibly exogenous FESE tick size harmonization, which triggered a substantial
number of HFT entries.
As of Monday, October 26th, 2009, the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm introduced FESE Tick
Size Table 2 for its OMXS30 shares.27 28 This regime change was part of the implementation of
harmonized tick sizes across all major European stock exchanges, and resulted in approximately
50% lower tick sizes on average for the Swedish OMXS30. Prior to the event, 53% of its stocks
were traded on the OMXS30 tick size table and 47% on the most liquid shares table, which
contains Sweden’s blue chip stocks rather than the literally most liquid stocks.
Figure 5 gives an overview of the tick size reduction for the relevant price levels from before to
after the event. The graph on the left-hand-side shows the relevant old and new tick size tables for
the stocks not traded on the table for the most liquid shares, while the graph on the right-hand-side
shows the table for the blue-chip stocks. Nearly all tick size levels were substantially affected by
the regime shift, except for those for the stocks traded on the most liquid shares table and with
stock prices from 100 SEK to 149.99 SEK. For these shares, about 18% of the entire population,
the tick size change had no effect. The reason that these stocks are not affected does not carry
27The tick size defines the minimum price movement and hence the minimum difference between bid and ask
prices in the order book.
28The FESE represents 46 exchanges for equities, bonds, derivatives, and commodities. This tick size
harmonization is an agreement drawn up by the Federation of European Exchanges, the London Investment Banking
Association and a number of European multilateral trading facilities (MTFs, equivalent to the alternative trading
system in the US), in July 2009.
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any fundamental information about the stock besides its price. As nominal stock prices usually
convey no information about the fundamental value of a stock, such as liquidity or volatility, it
is exogenous which stocks are affected and which are not.29 This reform had a direct effect on
the actual bid-ask spread, in which we observe a rapid decrease after the change in the minimum
bid-ask spread. Figure 6 exhibits the changes in the bid-ask spreads for the most liquid shares
and for the remaining shares listed on the OMXS30. Note that the bid-ask spreads do not change
either for the shares that are unaffected by the tick size change.
[Insert Figure 5 and Figure 6 about here!]
This change in the rules is of particular importance to our empirical design. It suggests that
we can identify the causal effect of competition between HFTs by comparing stocks that are
affected by the tick size change to those that are not using a difference-in-differences approach.
To be more precise, we divide all stocks into three portfolios: A, B and C. Portfolio A consists of
all shares that are not affected by the tick size harmonization and therefore serve as our control
group (about 20% of stocks). The remaining shares are split into two portfolios according to their
pre-event price. Portfolio B (about 20% of stocks) contains stocks that, given pre-event stock
prices and the new tick sizes, have a higher relative tick size than those stocks in Portfolio C
(about 60% of stocks). While the control group has a mean relative tick size of 8 basis points
and Portfolio B of about 7 basis points, Portfolio C has an average relative tick size of 3.5 basis
points. High-frequency trading becomes more attractive in Portfolio C, and competing HFTs
enter into trading. We depict these effects in a stylized way in Figure 7. The relative cutoff
point pi, below which high-frequency trading competition takes place, can be assumed to be the
minimum relative tick size before the event across all stocks. Testing for cross-sectional differences
between the control group and Portfolio B allows us to capture the direct effects of this tick size
change on market quality. As a second step, testing for differences between the control group (or
alternatively Portfolio B) and Portfolio C allows us to identify the effects of competition between
HFTs considering the direct effects from the first set of tests. To sum up, given pre-event prices,
we can predict which stocks face competition after the introduction of the new tick size regime,
29Exceptions are penny stocks, a phenomenon that indicates that the company faces bankruptcy. There are no
such stocks in our sample, though.
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and thereby disentangle the direct from the competition effects.
[Insert Figure 7 about here!]
We find that lower relative tick sizes increase high-frequency trading participation. In Figure
8 we show the changes in participation due to the tick size regime shift. While the control
group (Portfolio A) shows no increase in high-frequency trading participation, for both the stocks
without competing HFTs (Portfolio B) and those with competing HFTs (Portfolio C) there is an
increase. High-frequency participation for Portfolio B doubles from about 8% to about 16%, and
for Portfolio C it triples from about 8% to about 24% on average. This increase in high-frequency
activity for the stocks in Portfolio B is of particular importance, as we will show that market
quality tends to improve for those stocks that are only affected by the tick size reduction and
not also by competition. This suggests that the decline in market quality does not just reflect a
higher share of high-frequency trading, but indeed increased competition. This contributes to a,
to date, conflicting literature on how high-frequency trading is affected by tick size. While Gai,
Yao, and Ye (2013) find that there is more high-frequency market making with a low tick size,
Hagstromer and Norden (2013) find the opposite effect. Since we think of HFTs as traders that
exploit multiple investment strategies, we could make arguments for both.
[Insert Figure 8 about here!]
This increase in high-frequency trading activity with lower minimum relative spreads is also
the reason why we do not depend on spreads as a liquidity measure throughout our analysis. The
existing literature relies on the spread as a measure of liquidity that is affected by high-frequency
trading.30 While we do think that high-frequency trading might lower the bid-ask spread, it is
also true that a low minimum bid-ask spread encourages HFTs to trade more. As spreads are
correlated with relative tick size (for liquid stocks), it seems to be difficult to identify a causal
channel between high-frequency trading competition and spreads.
To confirm that differences in the nominal prices do not reflect any information about the
stocks, we provide statistics in Panel B of Table 8. There is no statistically significant difference
30See, for example, Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and Menkveld (2013), who show that high-frequency
trading activity reduces bid-ask spreads.
23
between the control and treatment groups for any of the endogenous variables prior to the event.
The crucial parallel trend assumption behind our difference-in-differences analysis is also shown
to be fulfilled, as there is no difference between the treatment and control group for any variable
of interest other than the treatment itself.
Using the tick size regime shift, we attempt to overcome the endogeneity concerns for a
subsample of our main dataset. This test is conducted in two steps. First, we test the direct
effect of the tick size change on market quality, using the unaffected stocks as the control group
(Portfolio A) and the affected, but not treated in the sense of competition, stocks as the treatment
group (Portfolio B). Second, we test the impact of competition using the unaffected stocks as the
control group and the stocks with competing HFTs as the treatment group. We depicted these
results in Panel A (competition effects) and Panel B (direct tick size effects) of Table 9. The
difference-in-differences estimation around the tick size regime change takes into account the two
weeks before and two weeks after the event. Panel A tests the impact of competition on short-term
volatility (column 1), illiquidity (column 2), high-frequency momentum trading (columns 3-5), and
price impact factors (column 6 and column 7). The estimates are comparable in both magnitude
and statistical significance to our main analysis. Illiquidity decreases by about 18%, and both
short-term volatility and directional trading increase significantly. Second, the direct effects of
tick size on market quality in Panel B suggest that lower tick size increases market quality. To
be more precise, the estimates show signs of improved liquidity, reduced volatility and directional
high-frequency trading. However, statistical significance is low or absent. This suggests that a
lower tick size might improve market quality and does not deteriorate it. In related literature about
tick size effects on market quality, there is no consensus over whether lower tick size improves or
worsens market quality (Jones and Lipson (2001) or Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000)). As discussed
earlier, all the stocks affected by the tick size change show more high-frequency trading activity.
The worry that the effect captured by our tests could be coming from an increase in high-frequency
trading activity alone, and not necessarily from competition, is not confirmed. An increase in
high-frequency trading activity increases market quality (Portfolio B), while competition between
HFTs deteriorates it. Since the results obtained from exploiting this plausibly exogenous event
are similar to those of the main analysis, we are confident that our results do indeed, overall,
represent the effect of competition between HFTs on market quality.
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[Insert Tables 9 about here!]
6.2 Propensity Score Matching
For the main analysis (entire sample), we provide evidence that pre-event stock characteristics
do not determine the shock caused by the event. We compare the pre-event behavior of a
propensity-score-matched sample of those stocks facing competition in the upcoming period (the
treatment group) against a propensity-score-matched sample of those that do not (the control
group).
Our matching procedure relies on a sample of propensity scores that are neither low (less than
or equal to 10%) nor high (greater than or equal to 90%). In other words, our matched samples
contain more equal stock events, while disregarding events that have a very high likelihood of
being treated and events that have a very low likelihood of being treated. In this way, we ensure
that our results are not driven by stock events with very different likelihoods of being in the
treatment group tomorrow given their stock characteristics today.
To calculate the propensity score, we conduct a probit regression at the stock event level, of
a dummy variable indicating whether or not a particular stock will face high-frequency trading
competition tomorrow, on stock characteristics. Specifically, we control for all market quality and
high-frequency trading measures used earlier in this paper, as well as other exogenous variables
such as turnover or bid-ask spreads from the pre-event days. There are 125 events (entries) that
form the treatment group, and 630 stocks in the control group.31 From this probit regression, we
obtain the propensity scores that we need to retrieve our matched sample. Panel B of Table 7
shows, in the left-hand column, the probit regression on the entire sample and, in the right-hand
column, that on the matched sample. The number of stock observations in the control group is
reduced to 205 and that in the treatment group to 101 as a result of our matching procedure. All
variables become insignificant and capture much less of the variation than prior matching, which
indicates that the matching has indeed yielded a sample of more equal pre-event characteristics.
Panel C shows the post-match competition effects on the market quality measures. Panel A of
31We only show the results for entries, but we obtain similar results for exits. When looking at exits the
procedure differs. We need to include only those stock characteristics not related to variables that are affected by
high-frequency trading competition prior to the event as stocks are in fact affected at this point. As an alternative,
we look at post-exit days and show that stock characteristics, including those affected by competition, do not differ
across the treatment and control groups.
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Table 7 shows pre-event averages and simple t-test differences between the treatment and control
groups prior to the event for both the pre-match and post-match samples. Differences become
insignificant throughout after the matching procedure, by design.
Given this matched sample, we repeat our difference-in-differences analysis; the results are
shown in Panel C. Column 1 gives the impact of competition between HFTs on volatility, controlling
for the level differences, whether the stock belongs to the treatment or control group, turnover,
bid-ask spreads, and time-, HFT-, and stock-fixed effects. The magnitude of the competition
coefficient is very close to that of the full sample and increases by about 20%. This is also true
for illiquidity, which increases by about 16 (column 2), directional trading that show a significant
increase through all three versions of the measure (column 3-5), and finally also for the price
impact factor, which increases by about 20%.
[Insert Tables 7 about here!]
Overall, the matching process removed any meaningful differences in stock market quality
measures and other stock characteristics in the pre-event period. This gives, not only additional
confidence that the parallel trend assumption holds, but also that high-frequency trading competition
is exogenous to the market quality measures and other endogenous variables affected by competition.
6.3 Symmetry of Entries and Exits
The effects of entries and exits are estimated simultaneously throughout the main analysis, but
here they are addressed separately. Our main results are discussed as events, which can be either
entries or exits. As indicated by the non-significant level differences (entry/exit fixed effect), there
should be no significant difference between entries and exits. In fact there is none, as we will show.
We re-estimate all our main results for entries and exits separately. In our main regression above
we combined entries and exit into one variable, and standardized them on entry, thinking of exits
as reverse entries. In this section, though, HFTexit is set to 1 if one or more of the competing
HFTs stops trading in the stock. This makes entries and exits intuitively comparable; the change
due to an entry should be offset by an exit, i.e. the effects are symmetric. Table 10 depicts
the results for liquidity and directional trading, for entries (Panel A) and exits (Panel B). The
structure and columns of the table are equivalent to the main table described in Section 4. Looking
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at entries and exits separately does not require us to control for the event type. Our test suggests
that there is a symmetric effect throughout. In other words, liquidity increases by about the
same magnitude when two or more HFTs are competing for trades as it decreases when there is
no high-frequency trading competition. The only measure for which we do not find a symmetric
significant effect is the price impact factor based on the number of relative net buying trades.
While the price impact factor for net buy volume clearly shows a highly significant increase with
entry and a decrease with exit, we find a decrease, but not a significant one, for exits when looking
at net buy trades. The magnitude and sign of the estimate, though, point in the correct direction.
This measure might be distorted by the unequal sizes of trades. Turning to volatility, entries and
exits are symmetric throughout, and the results from our regression are in line with our main
empirical findings. Table 11 shows these results. Overall, the symmetric effect of entries and exits
throughout our measures, in terms of significance and magnitude, provide additional comfort in
our results.
[Insert Table 10 and Table 11 about here!]
6.4 Alternative Measure of Competition
The measure of competition used in the main analysis does not take into account the possibility
that one HFT could dominate another trader. A simple dummy that measures competition
might be misleadingly interpreted as competition even though the increased HFT participation is
mainly coming from the incumbent HFT or entering HFTs. We therefore introduce a continuous
measure of competition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. This measure is calculated by summing
up all the HFTs’ squared shares of total high-frequency trading and is thereby between 0 and 1.
With a measure of 1, there is no competition, and with a measure close to zero, there is perfect
competition. The estimation results are shown in Table 12. Our findings from the main empirical
analysis are confirmed: stocks under more competition have higher short-term volatility, lower
liquidity, higher price impact factors, and more momentum trading.
[Insert Table 12 about here!]
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6.5 Short-Term Entries and Exits
The main analysis is conducted using observations of the three days before and three days after
entry (or exit). There are, however, 75 events (41 entries and 34 exits) that are short-lived. We
conduct a robustness check that tests whether short-lived events are different from those that
are longer-lived. For short-lived events, we observe only one day of non-changing competition
structure around the event. The potential concern here is that the results obtained earlier might
be driven by these events. Table 13 shows regression results that are very similar to the overall
estimates. The results are slightly smaller in magnitude and significance. This implies that our
main results are not just driven by short-term events. This can also be seen in Figure 4, where the
effect of competition remains significant after one day and pre-event differences are insignificant.
[Insert Table 13 about here!]
6.6 Standard Errors
We cluster standard errors at the stock level, which is the level at which our variable of interest
varies. A concern is that stocks might be serially correlated. This might become a problem as we
have only 30 clusters. Standard errors could be severely underestimated as a result. To ensure
that this is not actually the case in our research setup, we show a subset of our results both with
clustered standard errors on the stock level and without clustered standard errors on the stock
level. Table 14 presents these results. Clustering standard errors at the stock level always leads to
larger standard errors and thus to a lower significance level. In other words, clustering standard
errors at the stock level yields more accurate results.
[Insert Table 14 about here!]
7 CONCLUSION
High-frequency traders (HFTs) play a role of critical importance for the financial markets. HFTs
exploit not only liquidity-providing short-term investment strategies (e.g., market making), but
also liquidity-consuming short-term investment strategies (e.g., directional trading). When HFTs
face competition from other HFTs, liquidity-providing strategies will improve market quality,
while liquidity-consuming strategies will naturally worsen market quality. We find that competition
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among HFTs coincides with a decline in liquidity and an increase in liquidity-consuming high-frequency
trades as well as in high-frequency momentum trading. There is also an increase in intraday
volatility, but interestingly no effect on interday volatility, which corresponds to HFTs’ investment
horizons. Furthermore, we find a decrease in order execution time and an increase in the
market share of HFTs, although with no effect on overall volume or profit. We exploit the
cross-sectional variations in stocks and conduct difference-in-differences tests. Using the FESE
tick size harmonization that was implemented on October 26th, 2009, which affected some but
not all liquid stocks, we are able to draw causal conclusions. This paper provides results for both
entries and exits, both separately and simultaneously. To ensure that entries and exits are not
determined by pre-event differences between the endogenous variables, we also conduct propensity
score matching.
Through highly competitive and quick market platforms, the advantages of technologies such
as co-location, and/or the use of ultra-quick algorithms, HFTs have changed the financial markets
substantially, taking up to 85% of today’s equity market volume. HFTs tend to end the day with
inventories that are close to zero, frequently submit and cancel limit orders, and have short
holding periods. These changes have provoked intense discussion among legislators, regulators
and investors, leading to controversial views that span topics from price manipulation, speed of
trading, and systemic risk due to a high correlation of algorithmic strategies, to price discovery
and liquidity. The quality of liquidity that HFTs potentially provide is of particular concern,
as HFTs have replaced traditional market makers. Our findings contribute to this discussion,
providing new insights into how HFTs affect markets, and suggesting regulatory action that will
ensure that competition between HFTs is indeed competition between liquidity providers.
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A MIDPOINT APPROXIMATION
Analyses of short-term stock price behavior have to ensure that results are not determined by
market microstructure noise, i.e. the bid-ask bounce. We ensure this by computing our measures
based on midpoint prices and not on actual prices. A midpoint price is the price exactly halfway
between the bid and ask prices at a certain point in time (here, at five-minute and hourly intraday
intervals, for instance). Our data, however, include only actual realized prices and not bid and
ask prices. We therefore develop a new methodology for approximating these midpoints, and find
that the correlation between our approximated and the actual bid-ask spreads is 0.99. That is,
we match the actual bid-ask spread almost perfectly. The midpoint price approximation is:
Midpointt =
Pactive,buy,i + Pactive,sell,i−1
2
∗ Iactive,buy,Pactive,buy,i>Pactive,sell,i−1
+
Pactive,sell,j + Pactive,buy,j−1
2
∗ Iactive,sell,Pactive,buy,j−1>Pactive,sell,j , (9)
with i (j) being the last buyer-(seller-)initiated trade in interval t (which could be five minutes
long for example) and i− 1 (j − 1) being the last seller-(buyer-)initiated trade before this trade.
Pactive,buy (Pactive,sell) is the price from a buyer-(seller-)initiated trade. Iactive,buy,Pactive,buy,i>Pactive,sell,i−1
(Iactive,sell,Pactive,buy,j−1>Pactive,sell,j ) is an indicator function that is one if the last trade in interval
t is an active buy (sell) trade and is bigger (smaller) than the last seller-(buyer-)initiated trade.
To evaluate the accuracy of our approximation, we calculate the corresponding approximated
spread and compare it to the actual time-weighted relative spreads, which were separately provided
by NASDAQ:
Spreadt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(Pactive,buy,i − Pactive,sell,i−1) ∗ Iactive,buy,Pactive,buy,i>Pactive,sell,i−1
+
1
M
M∑
j=1
(Pactive,sell,j − Pactive,buy,j−1) ∗ Iactive,sell,Pactive,buy,j−1>Pactive,sell,j (10)
where i (j) are buyer-(seller-)initiated trades during interval t (five minutes) and i − 1 (j −
1) are the previous seller-(buyer-)initiated trades. Pactive,buy (Pactive,sell) is the price from a
buyer-(seller-)initiated trade. Iactive,buy,Pactive,buy,i>Pactive,sell,i−1 (Iactive,sell,Pactive,buy,j−1>Pactive,sell,j )
is an indicator function that is 1 if the trade during interval t is an active buy (sell) trade and
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is bigger (smaller) than the last seller-(buyer-)initiated trade. N (M) is the total number of
buyer-(seller-)initiated trades during these five minutes.
Figure 9 depicts both the approximated and the actual relative bid-ask spread. The approximation
works nicely, especially for very liquid stocks. As we focus our analysis on only the most liquid
stock, the relatively less liquid (Stock A) and the relatively more liquid (Stock B) stocks in our
dataset are both accurately approximated. Overall, for all daily spreads, the correlation between
the actual relative spread and our approximated spread is 0.99. Relatively more liquid stocks are
even closer than this to a perfect match. Relatively less liquid stocks are somewhat less correlated
(a correlation of 0.97 is the lowest we find). Summary statistics showing this are provided in
Table 15.
[Insert Figure 9 and Table 15 about here!]
B INSTITUTIONAL AND MARKET BACKGROUND
B.1 Market Share
The NASDAQ OMXS (Stockholm) had about an 80% market share in 2009, with a vast majority
of the trading volume in the NASDAQ OMXS 30, which lists Sweden’s largest public companies.
The closest competitor was BATS Chi-X Europe, with about 10% to 15% of the market share in
2009, followed by Burgundy and Turquoise with less than 5%.
B.2 Trading Hours
The limit order book market is open Monday to Friday from 9am to 5:30pm, CET, except on re
days (public holidays). Also, trading closes at 1pm if the following day is a red day. Both opening
and closing prices are set by call auctions. The priority rank of an order during the trading day
is price, time and visibility.
B.3 Account Types
To access the market, financial intermediaries have four different possibilities: (i) Broker accounts
are mostly used by institutional investors or non-automated trading. (ii) An order routing account
allows customers of the exchange member intermediary to route their orders directly to the market.
This is mostly used by direct banks such as internet banks. (iii) A programmed account is
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typically used to execute orders through an algorithm such as a big sequential sell or buy order.
(iv) Finally, there is the algorithmic trading account, which is the quickest and the cheapest in
terms of transaction costs and thus a natural choice for HFTs.
B.4 Brokers
There are about one hundred financial firms (members) registered at the NASDAQ OMXS.
B.5 Hidden Orders
An important detail about the NASDAQ OMXS is that members cannot place small hidden
orders. The rule for being able to hide orders depends on the average daily turnover of a specific
stock, but such orders must be at least 50,000EUR. This figure, however, increases with turnover
and reaches, for example, for a one million EUR turnover, a minimum order size of 250,000EUR.
As a result, HFTs have no incentive to hide their orders.
C HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING STRATEGIES
This section gives an overview of high-frequency trading strategies. In the SEC 2010 Concept
Release, high-frequency market makers are categorized into four types with four different strategies:
passive, arbitrage, structural, and directional market making.
C.1 Market Making
Market makers traditionally provide required amounts of liquidity to the securities market after
price pressure or other non-fundamental trading activity has moved the market. Thus, they bring
short-term buy- and sell-side imbalances back into equilibrium. In return, these market makers are
granted various trade execution advantages. The old structure, in which stock exchanges employed
several competing, official market makers, who were required to place orders on both sides of the
market and obligated to buy and sell at their displayed bids and offers, has changed dramatically
in recent years. Through highly competitive and quick market platforms, the advantage of
technologies such as co-location, and/or the use of ultra-quick algorithms, there have emerged new
market makers, HFTs, which are making it increasingly difficult for traditional market makers
to stay profitable. In 2010, one of the oldest market makers at the NYSE, LaBranche Specialist,
exited the market. Market making is a trade-off between offering prices that are keen enough to
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attract buyers and to attract sellers. Market makers provide liquidity on both sides of the book,
and earn the spread.
C.2 Arbitrage
High-frequency arbitrage means profiting from small temporary mispricing. Arbitrageurs mostly
trade aggressively (actively) as their opportunities are very short-lived. The mispricing could
originate from mispricings between indices or ETFs and their underlying constituents. Arbitrage
is mostly not perfect, implying that arbitrageurs often carry risk until their positions are closed.
C.3 Structural
Structural investment strategies take advantage of any structural deficits in the markets or in
certain participants.
Layering occurs when a false impression of liquidity is created. Orders may be entered into the
order book but canceled as soon as the liquidity is demanded by another trader. Quote stuffing
occurs when many orders are put into the order book on one side of the market, suggesting that
there is demand. Orders are quickly canceled as soon as the price moves in this direction, and an
opposite trading position is assumed.
Quote flooding is a practice whereby a HFT floods the market with quotes to slow down rivals
with inferior computer systems.
Firms have actually been sanctioned for spoofing (the above defined practices.).
C.4 Directional
Directional trading strategies involve an attempt to front run or trigger a price movement.
This includes anticipatory trading and exploratory trading. These high-frequency directional
trading strategies are about taking and unwinding positions so as to profit from anticipated or
self-generated price movements.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Sample Stocks
This table presents summary statistics for the NASDAQ OMXS30 three days prior and after an entry or exit of high-frequency traders. It lists the ISIN code, the
company’s name, number of daily trades, daily volume (in 1000 units), daily turnover (in 1000 SEK) and the relative time-weighted bid-ask spread. Column three shows how
often a specific stock occurs as a control, column four gives the number of changes from no high-frequency trading competition to high-frequency trading competition and
column five the changes from high-frequency competition to no high-frequency competition. The number of unique trading days for each stock is shown in column six (Note
that a stock may serve as a control for more than one event per day.).
ISIN Code Secuity Name Control Entry Exit
CH0012221716 ABB Ltd 32 3 2
FI0009000681 Nokia Corporation 48 0 0
GB0009895292 AstraZeneca PLC 29 5 4
SE0000101032 Atlas Copco AB A 57 2 1
SE0000103814 Electrolux, AB B 79 1 1
SE0000106270 Hennes & Mauritz AB, H & M B 57 4 4
SE0000107419 Investor AB B 59 0 1
SE0000108227 SKF, AB B 52 2 3
SE0000108656 Ericsson, Telefonab. L M B 62 5 5
SE0000112724 Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA B 55 1 2
SE0000113250 Skanska AB B 57 2 3
SE0000115446 Volvo, AB B 21 2 3
SE0000122467 Atlas Copco AB B 49 2 5
SE0000148884 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken A 57 4 4
SE0000163594 Securitas AB B 64 4 4
SE0000171100 SSAB AB A 56 2 3
SE0000193120 Svenska Handelsbanken A 46 5 5
SE0000202624 Getinge AB B 60 2 3
SE0000242455 Swedbank AB A 41 5 5
SE0000255648 ASSA ABLOY AB B 53 3 4
SE0000308280 SCANIA AB B 8 14 13
SE0000310336 Swedish Match AB 32 9 8
SE0000314312 Tele2 AB ser. B 54 2 2
SE0000412371 Modern Times Group MTG AB B 67 5 4
SE0000427361 Nordea Bank AB 47 7 6
SE0000667891 Sandvik AB 50 6 5
SE0000667925 TeliaSonera AB 33 5 4
SE0000695876 Alfa Laval AB 35 7 7
SE0000825820 Lundin Petroleum AB 74 0 0
SE0000869646 Boliden AB 60 1 0
Total/Mean 1494 128 100
Trades
No Days Mean SD
54 2316 1077
49 1545 570
55 2455 863
72 3331 947
89 3142 1311
82 4236 1677
73 1805 516
75 2798 1016
79 5986 2019
72 2266 818
83 2109 811
37 4171 943
75 1250 460
77 4651 1679
79 1659 782
79 2746 917
77 2255 963
70 1535 518
71 5454 2076
76 2270 897
74 1351 636
66 1446 499
72 2216 854
83 1485 537
74 3577 1389
71 3406 955
58 2688 1390
67 2215 674
83 1790 515
73 4241 1485
2145 2749 1648
Volume (1000)
Mean SD
2829 1338
1205 502
1321 452
5224 1605
2701 1372
2060 774
1924 702
3082 1432
17108 8753
2154 862
1965 914
6984 2183
1163 510
11070 4734
1940 1063
2820 1049
1786 641
887 473
11386 5355
2070 1009
906 387
1012 386
2001 1111
355 154
9194 3447
5497 1768
9271 5183
2225 962
1436 481
5188 2019
3922 4722
Turnover (1000SEK)
Mean SD
388568 176143
110902 47003
418987 143539
488603 150242
439715 223536
831174 313182
247540 90601
350031 168788
1197412 617496
208511 84315
213179 99676
472870 149712
97269 43480
513746 211720
131865 73863
306488 109205
338677 117238
113873 58061
765288 376062
249035 120835
82726 35999
148239 55642
198433 107238
110940 47783
672128 260518
431676 138283
440023 259887
193898 79892
86773 28329
423193 167698
357223 324766
Bid-Ask Spread
Mean SD
0.173 0.050
0.112 0.013
0.132 0.058
0.140 0.054
0.139 0.051
0.093 0.044
0.177 0.053
0.124 0.036
0.109 0.034
0.118 0.037
0.139 0.045
0.103 0.049
0.186 0.064
0.169 0.094
0.156 0.050
0.198 0.069
0.189 0.101
0.169 0.060
0.226 0.140
0.130 0.043
0.239 0.096
0.143 0.050
0.131 0.016
0.182 0.049
0.145 0.036
0.133 0.054
0.167 0.075
0.114 0.035
0.174 0.038
0.156 0.071
0.153 0.070
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of High-Frequency Traders
This table shows summary statistics for the two most different high-frequency traders in the market, high-frequency
trader A and high-frequency trader B. Statistics are reported for the daily fraction of high-frequency trades in the entire
market, the absolute number of daily high-frequency trades, the closing inventory of a high-frequency trader, the fraction of
active trades, and the fraction of high-frequency liquidity consuming trades. Closing inventory is the fraction of end of day
stock holding over absolute high-frequency trading over the day. The active side of the trade is an incoming market order or
marketable limit order that is executed against a standing limit order. A high-frequency liquidity consuming trade is a stock
buy after an increase in the stock price or a stock sell after an decline in the stock price.
High-Frequency Trader A
Mean Median SD
HFT Trades / Total Trades 0.1017 0.0841 0.0648
HFT Trades (per Day) 270 190 254
Closing Inventory (Daily fraction) -0.0001 0.0000 0.0993
Active Trades (fraction) 0.8974 0.9854 0.2602
Liquidity Consuming Trades / All Trades 0.5979 0.5802 0.1288
High-Frequency Trader B
Mean Median SD
0.0964 0.0807 0.0705
271 198 225
0.0031 0.0000 0.1161
0.3456 0.2676 0.2155
0.5358 0.5375 0.1039
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Control and Treatment Group
This table lists descriptive statistics for all stocks that serve as the control group and for all stocks in the treatment
group up to three days prior entry or three days post exit. We provide means and t-statistics for both the treatment and the
control group and their differences for a short-term versions of Amihud (2002)s measure of illiquidity, price impact factor,
daily stock turnover, midpoint return auto-correlations and order-execution times. Order-execution time is the median time
of how long an order is resting in the orderbook before it gets executed. We further provide statistics for hourly volatility
computed from hourly intraday returns, five-minute volatility based on five-minute intraday returns, max-min volatility
computed as the squared change from the maximum price within a day to the minimum price, open-to-close volatility shows
the squared change from the opening price to the closing price of the day and close-to-close volatility calculated from the
squared change from the previous day’s closing price to today’s closing price. Last, we show means and t-statistics for ratios
of liquidity consuming high-frequency trades and ratios of liquidity consuming high-frequency turnover. A trade is assumed
to be liquidity consuming if a buy trade follows a price (midpoint) increase five minutes prior to the trade or if a sell trade
follows a price decline.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Control Pre-Event Treatment Difference
Illiquidity (60 min) ∗ 1000k 0.018*** 0.017*** -0.001
(37.97) (14.27) (-0.60)
Illiquidity (5 min) ∗ 1000k 0.058*** 0.055*** -0.003
(36.83) (16.35) (-0.73)
Price Impact ∗ 1000 0.098*** 0.113*** 0.015
(17.56) (9.66) (1.14)
Turnover (in million SEK) 31.850*** 37.412*** 5.562
(7.47) (5.50) (1.31)
Autocorrelation -0.016*** -0.015** 0.001
(-4.67) (-2.01) (0.16)
Order − Execution T ime (in sec) 70.514*** 57.181*** -13.334
(9.83) (6.37) (-1.29)
V olatility (60 min) 0.023*** 0.021*** -0.002
(35.93) (9.60) (-0.89)
V olatility (5 min) 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.000
(48.90) (7.86) (0.08)
V olatility (Min−Max) 0.075*** 0.067*** -0.008
(14.35) (10.14) (-1.46)
V olatility (Closing − Closing) 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.007
(11.46) (8.14) (1.61)
V olatility (Opening − Closing) 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.003
(10.55) (6.72) (0.83)
Liquidity Consuming Trades 0.268*** 0.321*** 0.053
(12.64) (8.25) (1.40)
Liquidity Consuming Turnover 0.269*** 0.323*** 0.054
(11.99) (8.02) (1.38)
Observations 1,310 447
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Liquidity Effects of Competition between High-Frequency Traders
This table displays estimated coefficients of the following regression: ye,s,d = β1de,j + Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d, which allows for multiple time periods and
multiple treatment groups. With e indexing entry or exit of additional high-frequency traders, j being the security and d the time (day). de,j is an indicator of whether a
high-frequency trading entry affected security j at time d. pd are daily time fixed effects and mj are security fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the
error term. The dependent variables is ye,j,d and takes the form of a short-term versions of Amihud (2002)s measure of illiquidity (column 1-4), price impact factors (column 5
and column 6), daily stock turnover (column 7), five minute midpoint return auto-correlations (column 8) and order-execution times (column 9). Order-execution time is the
median time of how long an order is resting in the orderbook before it gets executed. Additional controls, besides the level variables (treatment fixed effect and entry fixed
effects for the type of event, entry or exit), are daily time fixed effects, stock fixed effect, lagged turnover, lagged bid-ask spreads and a dummy variable that indicates whether
a relatively more aggressive trader enters. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES ILLIQ ILLIQ ILLIQ ILLIQ (5 min) Price Impact Price Impact Turnover Autocorr Order-Execution Time
Competitioni,t 0.112*** 0.168** 0.148** 0.089** 0.237*** 0.217*** -0.029 0.026 -0.189**
(0.039) (0.080) (0.057) (0.034) (0.073) (0.061) (0.047) (0.097) (0.073)
Treatment FEi,t -0.027 -0.016 -0.004 -0.017 0.020 0.024 0.017 -0.063 -0.002
(0.049) (0.048) (0.040) (0.034) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044) (0.099) (0.049)
Entry FEi,t 0.036 0.038 0.026 0.031 0.018 -0.020 -0.032 0.030 -0.084*
(0.046) (0.044) (0.040) (0.029) (0.050) (0.043) (0.041) (0.080) (0.048)
Aggressive Event FEi,t -0.003 0.034 0.095 -0.003 -0.147 0.038
(0.048) (0.037) (0.057) (0.064) (0.107) (0.062)
Log(Turnoveri,t−1) -0.673*** -0.771*** -0.497*** 0.163** -0.618***
(0.035) (0.026) (0.033) (0.063) (0.031)
Log(Bid−Ask Spreadi,t−1) 0.146** -0.057 -0.186*** -0.054 0.025 1.232***
(0.062) (0.040) (0.044) (0.076) (0.137) (0.101)
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 1,999 2,169 2,169 2,175 2,175 2,175
R-squared 0.7210 0.7212 0.7815 0.8788 0.8513 0.8723 0.8346 0.0747 0.8154
- - - - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Volatility Effects of Competition between High-Frequency Traders
This table displays estimated coefficients of the following regression: ye,s,d = β1de,j + Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d, which allows for multiple time periods and
multiple treatment groups. With e indexing entry or exit of additional high-frequency traders, j being the security and d the time (day). de,j is an indicator of whether a
high-frequency trading entry affected security j at time d. pd are daily time fixed effects and mj are security fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the
error term. The dependent variables is ye,j,d and takes the form of hourly log volatility computed from hourly intraday returns (column 1-3), five-minute log volatility based
on five-minute intraday returns (column 4), max-min log volatility computed as the squared change from the maximum price within a day to the minimum price (column 5 and
column 6), open-to-close log volatility shows the squared change from the opening price to the closing price of the day (column 7) and close-to-close log volatility calculated
from the squared change from the previous day’s closing price to today’s closing price (column 8). Additional controls, besides the level variables (treatment fixed effect and
entry fixed effects for the type of event, entry or exit), are daily time fixed effects, stock fixed effect, lagged turnover, lagged bid-ask spreads and a dummy variable that
indicates whether a relatively more aggressive trader enters. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Vola (hourly) Vola (hourly) Vola (hourly) Vola (5 min) Vola (min-max) Vola (min-max) Vola (close-close) Vola (open-close)
Competitioni,t 0.156** 0.191** 0.199** 0.094** 0.127** 0.141** -0.062 -0.008
(0.071) (0.078) (0.075) (0.037) (0.058) (0.060) (0.124) (0.176)
Treatment FEi,t -0.010 -0.003 0.001 0.041 0.055 0.059 0.362 0.122
(0.082) (0.082) (0.073) (0.038) (0.054) (0.072) (0.215) (0.184)
Entry FEi,t 0.015 0.016 0.029 -0.003 -0.038 -0.021 -0.048 -0.175*
(0.078) (0.078) (0.071) (0.028) (0.039) (0.067) (0.124) (0.096)
Aggressive Event FEi,t -0.089 0.003 0.009 0.172 -0.023
(0.086) (0.044) (0.073) (0.186) (0.198)
Log(Turnoveri,t−1) 0.270*** 0.205*** 0.290*** 0.148 0.338***
(0.055) (0.030) (0.043) (0.122) (0.119)
Log(Bid−Ask Spreadi,t−1) 0.227** 0.585*** 0.284*** 0.171 0.623***
(0.092) (0.049) (0.093) (0.201) (0.152)
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,125 2,125 2,069 2,103
R-squared 0.4927 0.4928 0.5041 0.7395 0.5348 0.5512 0.2820 0.2732
- - - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Effects of Competition between HFTs on High-Frequency Trading Strategies
This table displays estimated coefficients of the following regression: ye,s,d = β1de,j + Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d, which allows for multiple time periods and
multiple treatment groups. With e indexing entry or exit of additional high-frequency traders, j being the security and d the time (day). de,j is an indicator of whether a
high-frequency trading entry affected security j at time d. pd are daily time fixed effects and mj are security fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is
the error term. The dependent variables is ye,j,d and takes the form of ratios of liquidity consuming high-frequency trades (column 1-3) and ratios of liquidity consuming
high-frequency turnover (column 4). A trade is assumed to be liquidity consuming if a buy trade follows a price (midpoint) increase five minutes prior to the trade or if a sell
trade follows a price decline. Column 5-7 show changes in liquidity consumption based on one minute pre-trade midpoint changes. The left hand side variable takes also the
form of three measures of directional (momentum) high-frequency trading (column 8-10) and of profit in column 11. Additional controls, besides the level variables (indicator
for the treated security, indicator for the type of event, entry or exit, and daily time fixed effects), are stock fixed effect, volume, bid-ask spreads and an indicator variable
whether a relatively more aggressive trader enters or exits. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
VARIABLES LC LC LC LC LC LC LC DIRECT1 DIRECT2 DIRECT3 Profit
Trade Trade Trade Turnover Trade Trade Turnover in
Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio 1000SEK
(5min) (5min) (5min) (5min) (1min) (1min) (1min)
Competitioni,t 0.186*** 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.301*** 0.249*** 0.251*** 0.341*** 0.337*** 0.449** 3.044** 244.208
(0.027) (0.048) (0.049) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.116) (0.193) (1.106) (281.630)
Treatment FEi,t 0.025 0.041 0.040 0.053* 0.055 0.054 0.037 -0.020 0.076 0.390 349.375
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.073) (0.140) (0.674) (220.981)
Entry FEi,t 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.008 0.045 0.042 0.028 -0.008 -0.175 -0.803 48.287
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.076) (0.160) (0.839) (190.897)
Aggressive Event FEi,t -0.061 -0.055 -0.077* -0.054 0.036 0.098 0.201 -465.723
(0.040) (0.038) (0.044) (0.039) (0.090) (0.119) (0.670) (291.859)
Log(Turnoveri,t−1) -0.013 -0.010 -0.004 -0.010 -0.383*** -0.646*** -3.727*** 274.019
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.071) (0.139) (0.584) (222.843)
Log(Spreadi,t−1) -0.040 -0.037 -0.058 -0.054 -0.333** -0.289 -3.167** -219.899
(0.078) (0.078) (0.090) (0.085) (0.149) (0.239) (1.341) (339.050)
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175
R-squared 0.5947 0.6012 0.6021 0.6093 0.5975 0.5987 0.6052 0.4526 0.3618 0.3679 0.1321
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Propensity Score Matching Diagnostics
This table provides evidence that we can treat competition as exogenous to the dependent variables. The sample
consists of the most liquid stocks. Stocks facing competition from other HFTs form the treatment group and stocks not
facing this competition make up the control group. This table shows results for the 125 entries. Panel A presents pairwise
comparisons of the variables that might trigger entry for the control, treatment and their differences. The time is for each
event the cross-section of the pre-event day. The Pre-Match columns show the entire sample and the Post-Match columns
the after match sample. Panel B shows parameter estimates from the probit model used to estimate the propensity scores for
the treatment and control group. The dependent variable is one if the stock faces competition between HFTs in the following
period and zero if not. All covariates included in the probit regression are pre-competition realizations. The Pre-Match
column shows the parameter estimates of the probit estimated on the entire sample prior to matching. The Post-Match
column contains the parameter estimates of the reduced sample after matching. From estimated propensity scores of the
whole sample, we keep the event if the score is above 10% or below 90%. Panel C gives results of the effect of competition
between HFTs on market quality with the matched sample entries.
Panel A: Pairwise Comparisons
Pre-Match Post-Match
Control Treatment Difference Control Treatment Difference
Log(Bid−Ask Spreadi,t) -2.035*** -2.202*** -0.167 -2.231*** -2.217*** 0.015
(-53.74) (-20.40) (-1.59) (-32.95) (-23.17) (0.17)
Log(Turnoveri,t) 3.121*** 3.136*** 0.015 3.315*** 3.207*** -0.108
(21.36) (15.04) (0.08) (18.39) (17.26) (-0.85)
Log(HourlyV olai,t) -11.090*** -11.190*** -0.100 -11.134*** -11.195*** -0.060
(-155.57) (-71.91) (-0.67) (-108.58) (-82.63) (-0.43)
Log(ILLIQi,t) -22.872*** -23.023*** -0.151 -23.129*** -23.088*** 0.041
(-154.44) (-94.35) (-0.70) (-124.31) (-110.27) (0.28)
DIRECT1i,t 0.229** 0.022 -0.207 0.122 0.059 -0.063
(2.39) (0.23) (-1.62) (1.32) (0.67) (-0.63)
DIRECT2i,t 0.231** -0.027 -0.258* 0.084 0.026 -0.058
(2.06) (-0.29) (-1.81) (1.12) (0.32) (-0.60)
DIRECT3i,t 0.456* 0.076 -0.380 0.227 0.167 -0.061
(2.01) (0.50) (-1.39) (1.21) (1.10) (-0.27)
Log(IMPACTi,t) -12.267*** -12.264*** 0.003 -12.338*** -12.306*** 0.032
(-57.42) (-47.63) (0.02) (-36.20) (-43.98) (0.24)
Observations 734 125 859 209 100 309
Panel B: Probit Regression Result
Pre-Match Post-Match
Log(HourlyV olai,t) 0.077 0.054
(0.31) (0.27)
Log(ILLIQi,t) -0.758* -0.336
(-1.90) (-0.86)
– continued on next page
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Table 7 – continued from previous page
DIRECT1i,t 0.254 0.201
(0.37) (0.31)
DIRECT2i,t -0.370 -0.374
(-0.62) (-0.67)
DIRECT3i,t 0.074 0.086
(0.46) (0.56)
Log(IMPACTi,t) -0.094 0.254
(-0.26) (0.88)
Log(Turnoveri,t) -0.312 -0.351
(-0.46) (-0.71)
Log(Bid−Ask Spreadi,t) 0.924 -0.419
(0.81) (-0.80)
Intercept -18.697*** -4.248
(-2.65) (-0.60)
Time FE YES YES
Stock FE NO NO
Control 630 205
Treatment 125 101
Observations 755 306
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.12
Panel C: Post-Match Competition Effects (Entry)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hourly Vola ILLIQ DIRECT1 DIRECT2 DIRECT3 IMPACT nb
Competitioni,t 0.196** 0.162** 0.364*** 0.370** 2.130** 0.203***
(0.085) (0.074) (0.122) (0.159) (0.958) (0.060)
level : Treatmenti,t -0.078 -0.038 -0.030 -0.040 0.013 0.004
(0.072) (0.053) (0.057) (0.085) (0.519) (0.042)
Log(Turnoveri,t) 0.706*** -0.581*** -0.304*** -0.504*** -3.284*** -0.188***
(0.082) (0.050) (0.065) (0.092) (0.640) (0.065)
Log(Bid−Ask Spreadi,t) 0.816*** 0.360*** -0.287 -0.218 -3.200** 0.097
(0.177) (0.106) (0.185) (0.274) (1.535) (0.099)
Observations 779 778 779 779 779 775
R-squared 0.5813 0.8104 0.5710 0.5268 0.5368 0.8228
- - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
44
Table 8: Summary Statistics: Tick Size Regime Change
This table depicts summary statistics and differences tests for before and after the event period as well as before
differences between the treatment and control group. Panel A shows statistics for two weeks prior and two weeks after
the event. We give statistics for bid-ask spreads, high-frequency volume, number of daily trades, stock turnover and
order-execution time. In Panel B, we show statistics and their differences for both the control and treatment group prior the
event. We depict means and t-statistics for bid-ask spreads, stock turnover, volatility, the measure of illiquidity, price impact
factors and three directional (momentum) high-frequency trading measures.
Panel A: Pre and Post Event
Before New Regime After New Regime
Obs Mean Median SD Obs Mean Median SD
Bid− Ask Spreadi,t 389 0.201 0.195 0.058 356 0.109 0.104 0.029
HFTV olumei,t(%) 389 0.098 0.078 0.074 356 0.195 0.174 0.105
Tradesi,t(#) 389 2521 2177 1501 356 3467 3120 1963
Turnoveri,t 389 37.820 28.727 38.708 356 38.538 30.126 34.277
V olumei,t(in1000) 389 4686 2473 5627 356 4606 2605 5190
Order − Execution Timei,t 389 99.645 78.998 84.677 356 33.690 25.002 24.176
Panel B: Pre Event Differences
Control Treatment Difference
Bid− Ask Spreadi,t 0.200*** 0.206*** 0.007
(12.32) (10.10) (0.26)
Turnoveri,t 24.882*** 45.278*** 20.396*
(4.54) (4.84) (1.93)
HourlyV olai,t 0.327*** 0.335*** 0.008
(7.85) (4.35) (0.09)
ILLIQi,t 0.000** 0.000*** -0.000
(3.32) (3.51) (-1.21)
DIRECT1i,t 0.248** 0.256* 0.008
(2.64) (2.27) (0.06)
DIRECT2i,t 0.262** 0.224* -0.038
(2.61) (1.97) (-0.26)
DIRECT3i,t 0.491** 0.363 -0.129
(2.49) (1.54) (-0.43)
IMPACTi,t 0.152 0.062* -0.090
(1.40) (2.24) (-0.82)
Observations 153 236 389
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Competition Between HFTs and the Tick Size Effect
This table provides separate results for both high-frequency traders entries (Panel A) and for high-frequency trading tick size
effects (Panel B), and displays estimated coefficients of the following regression: ye,s,d = β1de,j +Xe,j,dΓ + pd +mj + ue,j,d,
which allows for multiple time periods and multiple treatment groups. With e indexing entry or exit of additional
high-frequency traders, j being the security and d the time (day). de,j is an indicator of whether a high-frequency trading
entry affected security j at time d. pd are daily time fixed effects and mj are security fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of
covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variables is ye,j,d and takes the form of short-term volatility (column
1), a short-term version of Amihud (2002)s measure of illiquidity (column 2), three measures of directional (momentum)
trading (column 3-5), and price impact factors (column 6 and column 7) . Additional controls, besides the level variables
(treatment fixed effect and entry fixed effects for the type of event, entry or exit), are daily time fixed effects, stock fixed
effect, turnover, bid-ask spreads and a dummy variable that indicates whether a relatively more aggressive trader enters.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Hourly Vola ILLIQ DIRECT1 DIRECT2 DIRECT3 IMPACT nbv IMPACT nb
Panel A: Competition Effects
Competitioni,t 0.274** 0.182** 0.568*** 0.573*** 0.804** 0.001 0.150**
(0.136) (0.082) (0.205) (0.209) (0.376) (0.086) (0.070)
Log(Turnoveri,t) 0.637*** -0.601*** -0.123 -0.080 -0.399* -0.424*** -0.097*
(0.095) (0.058) (0.083) (0.117) (0.212) (0.060) (0.050)
Log(Bid− Ask Spreadi,t) 0.498*** 0.316*** 0.067 0.228 -0.194 -0.101 0.168**
(0.145) (0.104) (0.191) (0.209) (0.454) (0.105) (0.082)
Observations 745 739 744 744 744 745 745
R-squared 0.5732 0.8052 0.1711 0.1705 0.1584 0.8728 0.7283
Panel B: Tick Size Effects
TickSizeEffecti,t -0.028 -0.080 -0.456** -0.370* -0.344 0.067 -0.080
(0.127) (0.080) (0.179) (0.198) (0.403) (0.081) (0.064)
Log(Turnoveri,t) 0.695*** -0.671*** -0.335*** -0.287** -0.417 -0.519*** -0.182***
(0.146) (0.071) (0.121) (0.146) (0.284) (0.075) (0.047)
Observations 524 524 499 499 499 522 524
R-squared 0.5080 0.7128 0.3068 0.2924 0.3096 0.5000 0.5113
- - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
- - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Competition Effects of HFT Entry and Exit: Liquidity
This table provides separate results for both high-frequency traders entries (Panel A) and exits (Panel B), and displays estimated coefficients of the following regression:
ye,s,d = β1de,j +Xe,j,dΓ + pd +mj + ue,j,d, which allows for multiple time periods and multiple treatment groups. With e indexing entry or exit of additional high-frequency
traders, j being the security and d the time (day). de,j is an indicator of whether a high-frequency trading entry affected security j at time d. pd are daily time fixed
effects and mj are security fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variables is ye,j,d and takes the form of a short-term
version of Amihud (2002)s measure of illiquidity (column 1-4), three variations of our measures of directional (momentum) high-frequency trading (column 5-7), an midpoint
autocorrelation measure (column 8) and price impact factors (column 9-10). Additional controls, besides the level variables (treatment fixed effect and entry fixed effects
for the type of event, entry or exit), are daily time fixed effects, stock fixed effect, turnover, bid-ask spreads and a dummy variable that indicates whether a relatively more
aggressive trader enters. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ILLIQ ILLIQ ILLIQ ILLIQ 5 min DIRECT1 DIRECT2 DIRECT3 Autocorr IMPACT nbv IMPACT nb
Panel A: Entry
HFT Entry 0.137*** 0.202** 0.167** 0.099*** 0.367*** 0.476** 3.170*** -0.012 0.233*** 0.152**
(0.045) (0.089) (0.063) (0.035) (0.114) (0.182) (1.029) (0.108) (0.063) (0.062)
Treatment Dummy -0.038 -0.027 -0.033 -0.028 -0.044 0.005 0.243 0.026 -0.022 -0.029
(0.044) (0.045) (0.035) (0.030) (0.071) (0.110) (0.425) (0.081) (0.044) (0.035)
Active Trader’s Entry or Exit 0.031 0.046 0.066 0.040 -0.171 -0.209* 0.117* 0.101*
(0.053) (0.037) (0.097) (0.133) (0.677) (0.120) (0.064) (0.051)
Log Turnover(t) -0.649*** -0.765*** -0.395*** -0.668*** -3.823*** 0.195*** -0.496*** -0.142***
(0.037) (0.027) (0.075) (0.136) (0.434) (0.071) (0.035) (0.027)
Log(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.241*** 0.080* -0.317** -0.286 -3.121*** 0.093 -0.105** 0.125***
(0.071) (0.041) (0.143) (0.219) (0.831) (0.147) (0.050) (0.042)
Observations 1,932 1,932 1,932 1,783 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,936 1,937
R-squared 0.7206 0.7209 0.7824 0.8762 0.4578 0.3691 0.3756 0.0814 0.8711 0.7581
Panel B: Exit
HFT Exit -0.170** -0.230** -0.164** -0.105** -0.293** -0.384* -2.682** -0.099 -0.210*** -0.110
(0.066) (0.096) (0.069) (0.043) (0.121) (0.192) (1.063) (0.133) (0.074) (0.070)
treatment control exit day3 0.137** 0.208** 0.186** 0.179*** 0.347** 0.361 2.625** -0.006 0.221*** 0.081
(0.058) (0.095) (0.071) (0.047) (0.156) (0.236) (1.113) (0.128) (0.077) (0.065)
Active Trader’s Entry or Exit 0.015 0.045 -0.010 0.007 0.199 -0.131 0.222*** 0.141***
(0.061) (0.037) (0.119) (0.147) (0.849) (0.130) (0.065) (0.049)
Log Turnover(t) -0.665*** -0.686*** -0.414*** -0.736*** -4.107*** 0.135* -0.525*** -0.155***
(0.033) (0.028) (0.080) (0.150) (0.529) (0.074) (0.041) (0.032)
Log(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.240*** 0.192*** -0.185 -0.158 -1.681** -0.083 -0.075 0.148***
(0.071) (0.053) (0.154) (0.262) (0.809) (0.153) (0.059) (0.050)
Observations 1,727 1,727 1,727 1,620 1,730 1,730 1,730 1,730 1,724 1,724
R-squared 0.7259 0.7263 0.7881 0.8671 0.4765 0.3863 0.3966 0.0800 0.8799 0.7617
- - - - - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Competition Effects of HFT Entry and Exit: Intra- and Inter-Day Volatilities
This table provides separate results for both high-frequency traders entries (Panel A) and exits (Panel B), and
displays estimated coefficients of the following regression: ye,s,d = β1de,j + Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d, which allows for
multiple time periods and multiple treatment groups. With e indexing entry or exit of additional high-frequency traders, j
being the security and d the time (day). de,j is an indicator of whether a high-frequency trading entry affected security j
at time d. pd are daily time fixed effects and mj are security fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is
the error term. The dependent variables is ye,j,d and takes the form of hourly log volatility computed from hourly intraday
returns (column 1-4), five-minute log volatility based on five-minute intraday returns (column 5), max-min log volatility
computed as the squared change from the maximum price within a day to the minimum price (column 6), open-to-close
log volatility shows the squared change from the opening price to the closing price of the day (column 7) and close-to-close
log volatility calculated from the squared change from the previous day’s closing price to today’s closing price (column 8).
Additional controls, besides the level variables (treatment fixed effect and entry fixed effects for the type of event, entry or
exit), are daily time fixed effects, stock fixed effect, turnover, bid-ask spreads and a dummy variable that indicates whether
a relatively more aggressive trader enters. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hourly Hourly Hourly Hourly 5 Min Max-Min Open-Close Close-Close
Vola Vola Vola Vola Vola Vola Vola Vola
Panel A: Entry
HFT Entry 0.240*** 0.183** 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.085* 0.138** 0.019 -0.077
(0.088) (0.075) (0.081) (0.084) (0.048) (0.067) (0.219) (0.159)
Treatment Dummy -0.047 -0.063 -0.056 -0.045 0.013 0.044 0.113 0.321
(0.076) (0.070) (0.076) (0.069) (0.039) (0.054) (0.166) (0.208)
Active Trader’s Entry or Exit -0.067 -0.009 0.006 0.018 0.208
(0.091) (0.049) (0.064) (0.203) (0.222)
Log Turnover(t) 0.643*** 0.396*** 0.795*** 1.031*** 1.134***
(0.057) (0.024) (0.049) (0.127) (0.132)
Log(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.395*** 0.834*** 0.378*** 0.671*** -0.012
(0.087) (0.046) (0.074) (0.222) (0.183)
Observations 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,892 1,886 1,841
R-squared 0.2901 0.4899 0.4900 0.5474 0.7075 0.6330 0.3099 0.3347
Panel B: Exit
HFT Exit -0.291*** -0.191** -0.253*** -0.278*** -0.124*** -0.164** 0.035 0.048
(0.102) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.048) (0.074) (0.232) (0.177)
treatment control exit day3 0.273*** 0.195** 0.269*** 0.309*** 0.162*** 0.219*** -0.034 0.188
(0.096) (0.088) (0.092) (0.093) (0.055) (0.073) (0.234) (0.181)
Active Trader’s Entry or Exit -0.075 -0.020 0.015 -0.083 0.481**
(0.104) (0.057) (0.066) (0.226) (0.232)
Log Turnover(t) 0.621*** 0.386*** 0.779*** 1.152*** 1.187***
(0.062) (0.027) (0.052) (0.134) (0.124)
Log(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.361*** 0.850*** 0.305*** 0.723*** 0.117
(0.096) (0.050) (0.085) (0.256) (0.226)
Observations 1,730 1,730 1,730 1,730 1,730 1,681 1,672 1,639
R-squared 0.2780 0.4812 0.4816 0.5349 0.7021 0.6351 0.3126 0.3154
- - - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Robustness: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
This table displays results for an alternative measure of competition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and shows
estimated coefficients of the following regression: ye,s,d = β1HHIe,j +Xe,j,dΓ + pd +mj + ue,j,d, which allows for multiple
time periods and multiple treatment groups. With e indexing entry or exit of additional high-frequency traders, j being the
security and d the time (day). HHIe,j is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of competition between high-frequency traders
for entry and security j at time d. pd are daily time fixed effects and mj are security fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector
of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variables is ye,j,d and takes the form of short-term volatility
(column 1-2), of a short-term version of Amihud (2002)s measure of illiquidity (column 3), three variations of our measures
of directional (momentum) high-frequency trading (column 4-6), and price impact factors (column 7). Additional controls,
besides the level variables (treatment fixed effect and entry fixed effects for the type of event, entry or exit), are daily time
fixed effects, stock fixed effect, turnover, bid-ask spreads and a dummy variable that indicates whether a relatively more
aggressive trader enters. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Hourly Vola Hourly Vola ILLIQ DIRECT1 DIRECT2 DIRECT3 IMPACT nb
Competitioni,t (Herfindahl) -0.329** -0.296** -0.196* -0.736*** -0.895*** -6.322*** -0.323**
(0.159) (0.148) (0.108) (0.224) (0.316) (1.895) (0.157)
Aggressive Eventi,t -0.089 0.001 0.019 0.037 -0.095 0.077
(0.084) (0.047) (0.088) (0.114) (0.638) (0.052)
Log(Turnoveri,t) 0.625*** -0.661*** -0.385*** -0.645*** -3.731*** -0.149***
(0.053) (0.036) (0.071) (0.140) (0.598) (0.037)
Log(Bid− Ask Spreadi,t) 0.373*** 0.240*** -0.334** -0.273 -3.108** 0.141**
(0.082) (0.070) (0.147) (0.235) (1.324) (0.052)
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,165 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,169
R-squared 0.4920 0.5461 0.7826 0.4525 0.3604 0.3665 0.7549
- - - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Robustness: Short-Lived Entries and Exits
This depicts results for entries and exits that are short-lived (one day) and displays estimated coefficients of the
following regression: ye,s,d = β1de,j + Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d, which allows for multiple time periods and multiple
treatment groups. With e indexing entry or exit of additional high-frequency traders, j being the security and d the time
(day). de,j is an indicator of whether a high-frequency trading entry affected security j at time d. pd are daily time fixed
effects and mj are security fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent
variables is ye,j,d and takes the form of short-term volatility (column 1-2), of a short-term version of Amihud (2002)s
measure of illiquidity (column 3), and three variations of our measures of directional (momentum) high-frequency trading
(column 4-6). Additional controls, besides the level variables (treatment fixed effect and entry fixed effects for the type of
event, entry or exit), are daily time fixed effects, stock fixed effect, turnover, bid-ask spreads and a dummy variable that
indicates whether a relatively more aggressive trader enters. Standard errors are clustered at the stock level and reported in
parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Hourly Vola Hourly Vola ILLIQ DIRECT1 DIRECT2 DIRECT3
Competitioni,t 0.192* 0.208* 0.162** 0.336** 0.393* 2.819**
(0.095) (0.104) (0.065) (0.129) (0.195) (1.175)
level : Treatmenti,t -0.001 -0.019 -0.072 -0.015 -0.003 0.743**
(0.094) (0.082) (0.052) (0.059) (0.095) (0.347)
level : Event Typei,t 0.070 0.092 0.070 -0.018 -0.025 -0.677
(0.080) (0.066) (0.049) (0.056) (0.079) (0.557)
Aggressive Eventi,t -0.071 0.015 0.010 -0.040 -0.677
(0.102) (0.071) (0.117) (0.160) (1.042)
Log(Turnoveri,t) 0.620*** -0.667*** -0.374*** -0.612*** -3.732***
(0.069) (0.040) (0.071) (0.128) (0.573)
Log(Bid−Ask Spreadi,t) 0.362*** 0.252*** -0.238 -0.131 -2.159
(0.093) (0.059) (0.150) (0.247) (1.309)
Observations 1,715 1,715 1,710 1,715 1,715 1,715
R-squared 0.4875 0.5406 0.7904 0.4585 0.3548 0.3633
- - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - -
Cluster Stock YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Robustness: Clustered versus Robust Standard Errors
This table shows results why clustered standard errors are larger and therefore provide more robust results. We
depict estimated coefficients of the following regression: ye,s,d = β1de,j + Xe,j,dΓ + pd + mj + ue,j,d, which allows for
multiple time periods and multiple treatment groups. With e indexing entry or exit of additional high-frequency traders, j
being the security and d the time (day). de,j is an indicator of whether a high-frequency trading entry affected security j
at time d. pd are daily time fixed effects and mj are security fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the vector of covariates and ue,j,d is
the error term. The dependent variables is ye,j,d and takes the form of short-term volatility (column 1 and column 2), one
of our measures of directional (momentum) high-frequency trading (column 3 and column 4). Additional controls, besides
the level variables (indicator for the treated security and daily time fixed effects), are stock fixed effect, volume, volatility
(computed as intraday volatility of hourly returns). Standard errors alter between clustered standard errors at the stock
level and robust standard errors (in parentheses).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Hourly Vola Hourly Vola DIRECT1 DIRECT1 IMPACT nb IMPACT nb
Competitioni,t 0.194** 0.194** 0.337*** 0.337*** 0.135*** 0.135**
(0.083) (0.084) (0.087) (0.116) (0.045) (0.059)
level : Treatmenti,t -0.006 -0.006 -0.020 -0.020 0.027 0.027
(0.062) (0.067) (0.065) (0.073) (0.034) (0.036)
level : Event Typei,t 0.056 0.056 -0.008 -0.008 -0.038 -0.038
(0.058) (0.064) (0.061) (0.076) (0.031) (0.029)
Aggressive Eventi,t -0.108 -0.108 0.036 0.036 0.090** 0.090*
(0.076) (0.082) (0.080) (0.090) (0.042) (0.046)
Log(Turnoveri,t) 0.627*** 0.627*** -0.383*** -0.383*** -0.149*** -0.149***
(0.041) (0.063) (0.043) (0.071) (0.022) (0.027)
Log(Bid− Ask Spreadi,t) 0.380*** 0.380*** -0.333*** -0.333** 0.140*** 0.140***
(0.074) (0.088) (0.078) (0.149) (0.040) (0.040)
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,175 2,169 2,169
R-squared 0.5469 0.5469 0.4526 0.4526 0.7550 0.7550
- - - - - - -
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stock FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
HFT FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
- - - - - - -
Cluster Stock NO YES NO YES NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15: Summary Statistics of Midpoint and Spread Approximation
This table shows summary statistics comparing the approximated bid-ask spread to the actual bid-ask spread.
Obs Mean Median SD Correlation
Panel A: All Stock
Bid-Ask Spread (%) 3870 0.182 0.155 0.094
Bid-Ask Spread Approximation(%) 3870 0.184 0.156 0.095 0.9899
Panel B: More Liquid Stock
Bid-Ask Spread (%) 129 0.200 0.161 0.123
Bid-Ask Spread Approximation(%) 129 0.197 0.147 0.123 0.9961
Panel C: Less Liquid Stock
Bid-Ask Spread (%) 129 0.264 0.309 0.104
Bid-Ask Spread Approximation(%) 129 0.270 0.318 0.111 0.9675
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Figure 1: Stylized Motivating Example: Inventory
This figure shows a motivating example of an entering high-frequency trader. It presents high-frequency trading
inventory over a period of 20 days in 2009 for a single stock. Each vertical line represents the beginning of a new trading
day. The gray area is one entry event that enters the analysis. While the lighter gray area are trading days of the incumbent
alone, the darker gray area are days when there are competing HFTs trading in the stock.
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Figure 2: Summary Statistics of High-Frequency Trading Participation
This figure shows graphically average deviations from average trading participations of individual stocks for both the control and the treatment group. Average
trading participation under no competition is about 10%. The left-hand-side of the graph shows average effects of entries and the right-hand-side average effects of exits three
days prior and three days after the event.
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Figure 3: Summary Statistics of Illiquidity and Liquidity Consuming Turnover Ratios
This figure illustrates the effect of competition between high-frequency traders with simple means three days prior and three days post the event. The left-hand
graphs show entries and the right-hand graphs exits. The graph on the top shows means around the event a short-term version of Amihud (2002)s measure of illiquidity. The
bottom graph depicts averages for high-frequency consuming turnover ratios. A trade is assumed to be liquidity consuming if a buy trade follows a price (midpoint) increase
five minutes prior to the trade or if a sell trade follows a price decline.
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Figure 4: Dynamic Impact of Entry and Exit on Volatility
This figure shows point estimates for three days before and three days after the event from the difference-in-differences estimation. The plotted coefficients originate
from following regression:
ye,j,d = β1d
−3
e,j + β2d
−2
e,j + · · ·+ β3d3e,j +Xe,j,dΓ + pd +mj + ue,j,d,
which allows for multiple time periods and multiple treatment groups. With e indexing entry or exit of additional high-frequency traders, j being the security and d the time
(day). de,j is an indicator of whether a high-frequency trading entry affected security j at time d. pd are daily time fixed effects and mj are security fixed effects. Xe,j,d is the
vector of covariates and ue,j,d is the error term. The dependent variables is ye,j,d and takes the form of short-term volatility. On the left, we show the volatility increase after
entry and on the right we show the volatility decrease after exit.
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Figure 5: FESE Tick Size Harmonization
This figure gives an overview of the FESE tick size harmonization October 26th, 2009 for the OMXS30 for all
relevant price levels. Swedens most liquid stocks are traded on two different tick size regimes prior the harmonization. The
graph on the right-hand side shows the levels for Swedens blue-chip companies, the Most Liquid Shares, and the left-hand
graph for the remaining liquid stocks. The vertical axis depicts actual tick sizes in place for all relevant price levels.
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Figure 6: Actual Bid-Ask Spreads
This figure depicts the actual relative bid-ask spreads around the FESE tick size harmonization October 26th, 2009
for the OMXS30 for all relevant price levels. Swedens most liquid stocks are traded on two different tick size regimes prior
the harmonization. The graph on the right-hand side shows the relative bid-ask spreads for Swedens blue-chip companies,
the Most Liquid Shares, and the left-hand graph for the remaining liquid stocks. The vertical axis depicts actual relative
bid-ask spreads for all relevant price levels.
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Figure 7: Stylized Illustration of the Tick Size Regime Change
This figure presents how the FESE tick size harmonization October 26th, 2009 impacted stocks. The left-hand side
shows relative tick size (tick size / pre-event stock price) for all stocks prior the event and the right-hand side post event.
Stocks falling below the threshold pi (assumed to be the lowest relative tick size before the event) are predicted to face
competing high-frequency traders. Stocks are split into three portfolios according to pre-event prices. Portfolio A are stocks
with prices from 100SEK to 149.99SEK (blue-chip companies) and are not affected by the tick size change. Portfolio B
contains stocks that have relative higher predicted relative tick sizes than those stocks in Portfolio C. HFTs trading Portfolio
C face competition after the event.
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Figure 8: High-Frequency Trading Participation
This figure presents how high-frequency traders react on the FESE tick size harmonization October 26th, 2009 for
the OMXS30 for three different groups of stocks. The control groups are those stocks that traded within a price range of
100SEK to 149.99SEK prior to the event were therefore not affected by the tick size regime change. The tick size effect
(direct effect) is captured by those stocks without competing HFTs before and after the event. Finally, the figure shows how
high-frequency trading participation changes for stocks that face competing HFTs after the event. The vertical axis depicts
high-frequency trade participation, which measures how often a high-frequency trader participates in trading relative to all
trades.
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Figure 9: Midpoint and Spread Approximation
This figure pictures how our spread approximation and therefore our midpoint approximation performs against the
actual benchmark. The graph shows for a random time sample for both a less liquid stock (Stock A) and a more liquid stock
(Stock B), how close the actual spread and our approximation is. The vertical axis depicts relative bid-ask spreads.
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